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PREFACE 
When I began study in Hegel's philosophy a couple of years 
ago, I soon discovered that getting started in the system ilv.a 
veritable jungle. I found myself reduced to the expedient of reading 
and re-reading countless pages in book after book, but even then 
the task seemed hopeless. Having finally gained some working 
knowledge of the Hegelian system, it is my hope that this cursory 
introduction to the philosophy of Hegel will save others from the 
same dire labors and hours of frustration which I endured. 
This introduction is designed to aid a person with the 
desire to study the Hegelian philosophy of religion; it is not 
itself an introduction to his philosophy of religion (this ought 
to be obvious from the relative length of the early chapters and 
the relative brevity of the last two chapter0. It is hoped that 
three particular enemies of the reader in Hegel's philosophy can 
be overcome in this paper: the tracing of origins, the identification 
of main principles, and the vast literature. 
The first chapter is devoted to the roots of Hegel's philos- 
ophy. Initial exposure to this chapter may evoke the response 
that it is too involved and lengthy, but it will become apparent 
that it is precisely this kind of background material which gives 
a reader essential insights. This material is not found in any 
particular group of sources; it must be gleaned, point by point, 
from many sources. 
The second, third, and fourth chapters are devoted to an 
Preface, continued. 
exposition of his philosophy in its main outlines. The purpose 
of this exposition is to pinpoint the major principles whrch 
are operative in his philosophy. The problem which all four of 
the first chapters intends to alleviate is the fact that these 
principles are not clearly explicated in any small group of sources. 
The reader soon finds himself reading either general discussions 
which gloss over the key points of difficulty, or engulfed .byk 
a deluge of technical literature which discusses perhaps only one 
or two of many desired points. It is the purpose of this paper 
to congeal these many points into a simple, connected exposition. 
The mountain of literature is also a hazard which must be 
faced. One part of this problem is the fact that there is so much 
that one has no idea where to start, and what materials are in 
what source. The other part of the literature problem is also a 
familiar one, that one does not know whom to trust. Hopefully, 
if the reader will venture to trust the reports given at the end 
of each section, this dual problem will be alleviated. 
As mentioned above, this is not an introduction to his 
philosophy of religion. Besides being a topic much beyond the 
possible length of the paper, there are compe4t books on the 
subject. The purpose ofithis paper is rather to prepare the 
reader to study the philosophy of religion with comprehension. 
For this reason, the coverage of the actual philosophy of religion 
the conclusion 
in chapter Five and A: is much more basic and the literature- 
reports are much smaller. (Besides, the literature is so• massive 
that it would be more confusing than helpful.) 
Regarding the extent of the originality in this paper, I 
-iii- 
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should say that on the whole, the material is digested from a 
multitude of sources and explained in my own fashion. Several 
insights were not found in any resource. 
It seems appropriate that I acknowledge here a great debt 
to Dr. James Collins. It was in a seminar which he conducted 
that I was led to begin studies in Hegel, and I owe a great deal 
to his penetrating scholarship both in the classroom and in the 
pages of his books. 
A Note on Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations refer to books described in the 
Bibliography, as follows: 
Phen. Phenomenology of Spirit, translation by Miller 
PhAn. Phanomenologie des Geistes, volume 9 of the 
Gesammelte Werke 
Science of Logic This is the Miller translation. 
Wissenschaft der Logik This is the Lasson edition, in the 
Philosophischen Bibliothek edition. 
Chapter One: Influences on Hegel's Development 
An enduring nemesis of the historian of thought is the fact 
that every thinker (indeed, every age) is both a result  of 
what transpired before and also an individual entity with an 
inexpressible cenipa. There is a tension between study of the 
concrete formative influences on a thinker and the unique personal 
insights of the person. We will not understand Hegel by simply 
reading about his age and influences, nor will we understand him 
by reading summaries of his works in an encyclopedia. In order to 
reach a balance between influence and individualjty, we will in 
the first two chapters cover background material and in the third 
and fourth chapters cover the essentials of his system in general.' 
In this first chapter we will cover the following five areas 
of influence on his philosophy: Greek philosophy, Rationalism, 
the Enlightenment, Post-Rantian Idealism, and Romanticis*.2 
A. Greek philosophy 
It is with good reason that Hegel is often called the 
"German Aristotle." Not only were his interests as broad as 
Aristotle's; Hegel managed to incorporate much more Greek thought 
into his philosophy than his contemporaries (who were also involved 
in a kind of Greek revival). We will introduce the matter with 
a brief note, and then see how Greek philosophy influenced Hegel. 
1. Ancients and Moderns. In the "history of ideas" literature 
there is frequent reference to "the quarrel between the ancients 
and the moderns." This is a convenient way to get at much of 
what Hegel wanted to accomplish in his philosophy.3 The problem 
is usually set up in terms of a "quarrel" over the applicability 
of ancient learning to modern intellectual growth. The problem 
surfaced in the seventeenth century, when the ideals of Sir 
Francis Bacon came to the forefront in scientific experiments. 
Bacon called for banishment of the anti-experimental attitude 
in Greek science which had paralyzed research in the Middle Ages. 
Thus he became a pioneer in the direct observation approach to 
scientific learning. The three points of contention which the 
seventeenth century raised against the ancients may be summarized 
as: an attack on tha authority of the untested wisdom of the 
ancients, impatience with those who copy books in lieu of observing 
nature, and the importance of inductive experiments.4 As we will 
see, this new way of doing scientific study led to a new world 
view which was scandalously different from that of the Greeks. 
Although the study of Jones is limited to Englamdi: it covers 
the topic thoroughly. This theme is also applied to areas 
of learning other than science, including literature. A 
more general survey is to be found in the excellent treatment 
of Randall, chapters IX and X. See also Phen 19/PhAn 28. 
2. Plato and his predecessors. The pre-Socratic philosophers 
are certainly important in understanding Hegel's development. 
This is so partly because their philosophy became the basis for 
Plato's thought (very important to Hegel) and partly because 
Hegel was directly influenced by their thoughts. Of particular 
interest are Anaxagoras (praised for his theory of voOc; note 
Phen 34/PhAn 40), Heraclitus (whose dictum ndvra pet Hegel 
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viewed as an early expression of his own philosophy of absolute 
Werden ["becoming"]), and the Eleatics (Zeno and Parmenides in 
particular) who discovered the limits of, merely dialectiCal 
reasoning. 
Hegel had a veri high.Tegard for the thought of Socrates 
(c.470-399 BC.) and Plato (428-348 BC.). He considered Socrates 
the first to discuss conscious subjectivity and the notion of 
universal truth. Socrates' emphasis was on the Universal, in 
opposition to the arbitrariness of the Sophists, and this made 
him an immensely important figure in Hegel's eyes. Unfortunately, 
the Socratic dialectic (as reported by Plato) was often as 
destructive as it was constructive. 
We will note four primary aspects of Plato's phiiposophy 
which are important for understanding Hegel. First, Plato's claim 
that the Forms baocaLJ are the basis of reality seemed to Hegel 
to foreshadow his own doctrine of the Idea. Second, Plato's 
understanding that reality is two-tiered, with the sensible real-
ity in flux around us and the true reality, the Forms, fixed above, 
seemed to Hegel to be important in reminding us that the world 
as it, appears around us is one of deception and endless change 
(this is the meaning of the cryptic passage in Phen section 47/ 
PhAn page 35). Third, Hegel believed that Plato's philosophy 
approximates closer to his than most later philosophers, because 
Plato's conceptual apparatus was more flexible. Fourth, the 
Platonic doctrine of 4vduvna.cj [reminiscence]is of great sign-
ificance for Hegel (e.g., note Phen section 13/PhAn p.15). 
The material probably more helpful thanirany other one source 
is in Gadamer's f+rat essay. Gadamer's well-seasoned schol- 
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arship is evident (but the translation is poor--see the 
original, cited in the bibliography of articles at the end 
of this paper). The essay of Findlay in O'Malley History 
is helpful, but the criticisms of Palmer which follow it 
are justified. MalUschke has a very helpful analysis of 
how Hegel viewed Plato's Parmenides on pp. 43-54. Stace 
is interesting but typically verbose and not entirely 
accurate. Wiehl focuses on the roots of Hegel's metaphysics 
in Plato's predecessors and in Plato's theory of Forms. 
Bloch's chapter "Hegel and die Anamnesis; Contra Bann der 
Anamnesis" is a reasonably accurate assessment of Hegel's 
doctrine, but Bloch does not hesitate to disagree with 
Hegel's whole theory of Erinnerung [remembering). 
3.Aristotle. Hegel's close affinity with the philosophy of 
Aristotle is well established, though aspects are woefully in 
need of further research. Though there are many points of simil-
arity, we will isolate the four main ones here. 
First, Aristotle's teleology is conspicuously vresint,An 
Hegel's cosmology. Not only does the word Zweck and its com-
pounds appear frequently in his writings (e.g. Gauvin's Wortindex 
lists over 250 instances of Zweck in the PhAnomenologie des Colston 
alone) ; the very Aristotelian view of teleology as immanent in 
nature is clearly also Hegel's own position. 
Second, the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism is present 
in Hegel's philosophy in at least two ways. The more obvious 
presence is simply in Bagel's dialectical pattern, as he claims 
that we begin with a universal, qualify it with a particular claim 
(for him, "negation"), and draw a conclusion which is neither 
of the prewisses alone, but a new synthetic thesis. The presence 
of this influence is (I believe) attested to by the frequency 
with which we find the word for "(logical)middle term" [mitt.) 
appearing in the non-logical works (e.g., according to the Wortindex 
the word Witte appears 63 times in the Phlinomenologle. 
The other use of Aristotle's syllogistic is to be found in 
-5- 
Hegel's account of how philosophical "knowledge" progresses and 
accumulates. Remembering that for Aristotle and for Hegel "science" 
is not an empirical gathering of facts (the modern approach) but 
absolute truth, Aristotle claims that we attain scientific truth 
by stadting with the definition of the essence of the thing as 
the major premiss of the syllogism, adding a minor (particular) 
premiss gained from experience, and reaching a conclusion. The 
conclusion is then the new major premiss for a further syllogism, 
and knowledge i thereby accumulated. Aristotle claims that 
definitions are formed by a process of induction itumwori] 
from experience (Posterior Analytics 11,19). On the basis of 
Aristotle's claim that the definition of definition contains 
both a universal genus and also difference (Metaphysics 1037b-
1038a) we may note that Hegel starts on a similar note in the ,  
logical progression of his metaphysics. Further, as in the syl-
logism of Aristotle, the universal-particular-conclusion pattern 
is fundamental to the movement of his system. Finally, the 
Hegelian notion of Erfahrung (experience] as the source of the 
middle terms for the "syllogism" of philosophy runs parallel to 
Some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. (See pp.44-45 below.) 
Third, Aristotle differed from Plato in taking the essences 
of things out of the "beyond" and placing them in the things 
themselves. Hegel and Aristotle agree that the essence of the 
thing is in the thing (compare Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 
Forms add Hegel's criticism of Kant's "thing-in-itself"), that 
it is a self-contained unit and that its essence can be discerned 
from it (this is the point of Hegel's clever use of the word for 
perception, Wahrnehmung ("grasping the true"]). This. is parallel 
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to Aristotle's use of the concept of intuition (vo0c), that 
we intuitively know the essences which are contained in a 
definition and thereby know the o6aCa or r6 TL fiv etym.. Further, 
as we will see, Hegel's vocables Selbstsweck [self-contained-
goal] and Mirklichkeit (actuality (=2"balanced reality")] approx-
imate to Aristotle's evyeXixem [actuality, form, essence]. 
Finally, it seems that Hegel's concept of "God" was inspired 
by Aristotle's famous characterization of god as "thought thinking 
on thinking" (Metaphysics 1072b, quoted by Hegel at length at the 
end of the Encyclopedia). 
The outstanding treatment of the relation between Aristotle 
and Hegel is by Mure. As a major translattor of the Oxford 
edition of Aristotle's works, he is eminently qualified to 
discuss their relationship.. Others especially helpful are 
Gray, Weiss (Hegel's Critique), and Findlay (Re-examination). 
Also helpful in a broad way are Gadamer's first essay and 
Rosen (who is good on the whole topic of Greek philosophy 
in Hegel). One who is seeking a very basic discubsion will 
find Stace tielpful. Regarding the connection between Arist-
otle's defi4ion of'definition and Hegel's metaphysics, the 
only literature I am aware of is a remark in Glockner's 
essay (p.82, fn.14). This deserves more investigation. 
4.Neoplatonism and mysticism. There is certainly a strong element 
of Neoplatonic influence in Hegel's philosophy. This is most 
evident in the basic cosmological doctrine of Neoplatonism, the 
exit-reditus pattern. Neoplatonists typically held that the 
ultimate reality is the (Me, which is beyond time and space (and 
our knowing). From the One emanated the divine mind (not a deity 
to be worshipped), from which emanated the entire world. There 
is thus an exit of the world from the divine mind, and at the end 
of time there will be a great return (reditus) to the divine mind. 
This is a more picturesque way of stating the main point of Hegel's 
philosophy. 
The outstanding source on this relation is Rosen, pp. 52ff. 
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Bloch also has some helpful material on pp. 479-480. Research 
in this area is woefully lacking. 
Also of interest is the hereitage of German mysticism which 
its mark on Hegel. Of particular interest is Jakob BOhme (1575-
1624), who receives high praise from Hegel. B8hme was a visionary 
mystic who claimed to have seen_ "the Being of Beings, the Byes 
and the Abyss, the eternal generation of the Trinity, the origin 
and descent of this world, and of all creatures through the Divine 
Wisdom" (Second Epistle, section 6). He claimed to have seen the 
Urgrpnd, the metaphysical gtourid of being, and claimed that the 
Urgrund has a will for self-knowledge (cc the Father) which gener-
ates and "knows") a "heart" (not a literal heart, of course) 
which is the Son. Emanating from these two is the "moving life" 
(21: the Spirit); this triadic relationship is the pattern for the 
existing world. While much more could be mentioned from'his 
philosophy which would elucidate Hegel, this ought to be sufficent 
to show the kind of influence which certainly exists. 
An excellent resource on this topic is the dissertation of 
Annegrit Brunkhorst-Hasenclever, pp. 257-264. Bloch main-
tains the largely tenable thesis that Hegel's language is 
actually a melting pot of many "languages": theological, 
mystical, attistic, Swabian idioms, aphorisms, catchwords 
of the Romantics, etc. (pp.18-21). 
B. Rationalism 
1. Descartes. Hegel affirmed what has traditionally been said 
of Descartes (1596-1650), that he is the fQder of modern phil-
osophy. This is so, it is commonly agreed, because Descartes 
took the "transcendental turn" to the consciousness of the thinking 
subject. We note,  that Descartes began his philosophy on "sys-
tematic doubt" of everything except the premiss "I think, there- 
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fore I am." He was convinced that God has placed"dear and 
distinct" ideas in his mind, and since it is impossible for God 
to deceive, these ideas are an adequate basis of knowledge. (His 
thought is viciously circular: the veracity of my knowledge is 
guaranteed by God, and the notion of God is itself a "clear and 
distinct" idea.) Hegel praises Descartes for takingtthis turn 
to the consciousness (Hegel's own Phenomenology starts with the 
consciousness), but Hegel faults Descartes for stopping at a 
single stage of doubt (negation). It is not, on Hegelian grounds, 
sufficent to recognize finitudeity negating; we must negate the 
negation. 
We can also note Hegel's affinity with the movement called 
Rationalism (of which Descartes is acknowledged to be the "founder") 
There are two basic points which Hegel's vision shared with the 
aims of Rationalism: "1) the objective of coming to a comprehension 
of the All (daS Ganze)p the totality of being, or, as they fre-
quently called it, the 'Absolute'; 2) the objective of describing 
the world precisely as an organized system of Reason„"5  
The article by Weiss ("Cartesian Doubt and Hegelian Negation") 
in O'Malley (History)summarizes the situation very well. 
An equally worthwhile treatment is to be found in Navickas, 
chapter 1. 
2,Spinoza; Hegel regarded Spinoza (1632-1677) as the most 
important rationalist, and we will be well repaid if we find out 
why. Spinoza may well have been the greatest single influence. 
on Hegel's philosophy. 
A key axiom in Spinoza's system is mania determinatlo est 
negatio(every determination is a negation). By this he means 
that when the infinite is determined (meaning "limited", not 
"caused") there are particular restraints placed on it. Whenever 
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infinite being is qualified (as is the case when we designate 
existing particular things) Wire is also a finitOde or negativity 
expressed. All existing things share the characteristic finitude 
which is a limit, or negativity, in its relationship to infinite 
Substance. 
Hegel takes the liberty of converting Spinoza's formula 
("liberty" because this is not justified on logical grounds) to 
a formula which suits his purpose: nallinegation is determination 
[Bestimmtheit]". This is the most basic principle in Hegel's 
philosophy. Although all positive descriptdon is, as Spinoza 
says, negative, it is thus equally true that all these finite 
determinations are positively existing. In other words, it is 
equally true to say that all (limiting) determination is egation 
and all negativity is positively existing. In the context of 
Hegel's system, we can further say that all that exists is 
essentially negative. Negativity is the foundatiin of all existing 
things. 
Hegel's criticism of Spinoza in this matter is based on the 
fact that Spinoza stopped with a single negation. Hegel holds 
that without a negation of negation, the particularity which is 
entailed by the first negation will never be overcome an4here 
will be no unity. In other words, it is necessary to negate the 
finitude which is implicit in the first negation if we are to 
unite reality. More will be said About this in the discussion 
of dialectic in Chapter IV. 
There is another point on which we see the direct.influence 
of Spinoza on Hegel's philosophy. Spinoza rightly affirms that 
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the infinite, properly conceived, is completely free from limits 
and particulars/determinations. Since the infinite is undeter-
mined, it is impossible to attribute any qualities to it, and 
hence even to think or speak about it. This approach is certainly 
evident in how Hegel treats the Idea (and ordinary mental concepts), 
claiming that without the particulars of human experience the 
universal is empty and meaningless. (But this is also in Kant: 
"Gedanken ohne Inhalt rind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe rind 
blind" [thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind" Katlic der reinen Vernunft, A51/1975). 
Finally, we note in passing Spinoza's infamous formula Deus 
sive Nature [God or Nature; God = Nature]. Spinoza is ordinarily 
called a pantheist because he recognized no real distinction between 
God and Nature. We cannot discuss the implicit influence of 
his monotheistic Jewish background on this view, but it is 
important to see a similarity between his conclusion and that 
of Hegel (who held that "God" became the world). Spinozism was 
very popular among the Romantics at Hegel's time. For example, 
Goethe was known to carry a copy of Spinoza's Ethics in his 
coat-.pocket, and Hegel's predecessor in the first chair of phil-
osophy at the University of Berlin, Fichte, generated such an 
AthelsZmusstreit [atheism-tontroversyl while at•_the Upiversity 
of Jena that he was compelled to leave in 1799. Hegel's close 
friend and co-editor of a journal '.Schelling was & known pantheist. 
A very good treatment of this connection is to be found in 
NalUschke, Chapter 3. Sarlemijn, pp. 121-124, is extre#mely 
important, as is Rotenstreich, passim. Stace's treatment 
is brief but substantial (pp. 32-34). 
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C. The Enlightenment 
The complex nature of what is usually called the Aufkl&rung 
[Enlightenment] is such that it is very difficult to characterize 
it accurately. It involved the physics of Newton, the anthropology 
of Hume and Kant, and the social theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, 
to name just a few strands of activity. We may portray the out-
come of this age by summarizing the resulting anthropological 
problems in two statements. First, it became necessary to clarify 
(auflaaren) the new-found human subjectivity in its relation to 
the new-found scientific objective reality (understood by Rom-
antics as the problem of the "one and all"). Second, it became 
necessary to clarify the general conclusion that as part of nature 
man is subject to the same natural laws as the restiof nature 
(understood by the Romantics as the problem of human freedom). 
We note that these are the two very problems which Kant, the 
epitome of Enlightenment thinkers, felt constrained to address 
(" the starry skies above and the moral order within"). 
1. Rousseau. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) formulated a 
theory of religion which greatly influenced Kant and the young 
Hegel. Rousseau claimed that whatever is convincing in the 
"sincerity of the heart" demands our assent. This, combined with 
his conviction that the conscience is essentially pure but often 
corrupted by corrupt society, forms the basis for his religious 
thought. His philosophy is based on a sort of Cartesian certainty, 
whereby the convictions of the heart are guarantedd by a superior 
being called God. Self-certainty is both the basis for our 
conviction that God guarantees truth and for assurance that our 
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moral beliefs are well-grounded. 
It is well known that Kant tried to modify this scheme with 
the substitution of human reason for the immediate certainty of 
God's work in the conscience. Thus, for Kant, rational deliberation 
is the new basis for grounding our moral decisions. This becomes 
a moral theology when Kant adds the claim that there must be some 
connection between moral goods here on earth and some reward 
for attending to these goods. It is God who supplies the nec- 
essary connection between goods and rewards with the promise 
of a blessed hereafter. 
Clearly, this is not a convincing rehabilitation of,Rousseau, 
either from the standpoint of traditional theology or from a 
perspective or moral philosophy. Nonetheless, this was the 
approach which the young Hegel and his comrades embraced while 
in their formative years at the Tubingen Seminary. 
Despite the importance of this connection, the literature 
is alarmingly small. The best explicit treatment is by 
Dieter Henrich in Christiansen (Hegel and the Philosophy 
of Religion). The first chapter of Taylor is also part-
icutarly useful. A more general discussion is generated 
by Kreger. On Hegel's enthusiasm for Rousseau as a 
Revolutionary dUring his Tubingen days see Rosenkranz (32-
34) and Wiedmann(English version) pp. 19-22. 
2. Kant. Trying to describe the relationship between the 
philosophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1604) and Hegel in the space 
of a few paragraphs is an extremely difficult task. Hopefully, 
what follows is an adequate indication of what is happening; 
clarification can be gained from the sourcesllisted at the end 
of this section. In the material which follows, we will try to 
achieve the following goals: a) show how Kant's philosophy 
set up a problem which Hegel tried to remedy, b) note Kant's 
treatment of the proofs for God's existence, and c) note how 
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Kant's philosophy of religion set the stage.fer Hegel's early 
encounters with Christianity. 
a. The kantian philosophy in general. In agreement with 
the skeptical philosophy of Hume, Kant acknowedged that the 
general problem of philosophy is to determine the grounds for 
certainty in knowledge. Kant allowed Hume's claim that the 
mind is barraged by a storm of confused sense-data, but added 
his own claim that the mind structures the data. Kant further 
claimed that the mind operates on three levels: sensibility (i.e. 
sense perception), understanding IVerstandl, and reason Ivernunft]. 
The two forms of sensibility which order the incoming data are 
space and time. While the forms of sensibility fall under what 
he calls the "Transcendental Aesthetic" (transcerigental refer-
ring to the fact that this faculty is above the material it puts=; 
in order), the understanding operates with the "Transcendental 
Analytic." This function of the mind is to organize and describe 
what is grasped by sensibility in propositional statements. These 
two functions of the mind are strictly confined to knowledge 
deritried from sense experience, but the faculty of reason goes 
beyond these c ncepts to what is not observable. The faculty 
of reason (using the "Transcendental Dialectic") is concerned 
with what are usually called theology and metaphysics. 
While knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding 
is on certain footing, he claims, because it is based on exper-
ience, the ideas of the faculty o4reason are only postulates. 
The three postulates (corresponding to the traditional Rationalist 
categories [viz. Whiffler))) are God, the World, and the Soul. 
-14- 
None of these are observable, and each is frought with problems 
in the history of thought. Regarding rational psychology (the 
soul) Kant showed the paralogisms (logical fallacies) which attend 
the premisses which are nonetheless accepted as true. Regarding 
rational cosmology (the world), Kant shows that contradictory 
propositions can be proved regarding the status of the world 
(antiosmies). Finally, rational theology is impossible, as we 
will see. 
What good are these ideas of reason? They help us unify our 
experiences. The idea of the soul gives us a point around which 
to gather our experiences, i.e., a self. The idea of the world 
preserves the concept of human freedom, and as we noted above, 
the notion of God serves to furnish us with a notion of retribution 
and reward necessary for ethics. 
Having laid this groundwork, we can now make the application 
to Hegel's philosophy. First, we note that what Kant calls the 
transcendental dialectic is a purely negative concept. This is 
so, because Kant claims that Reason cannot legitimately. form 
positive (constitutive) ideas, only negative (regulative) ideas. 
This is important, for we can see that Kant is employing Reason 
only to keep our lives in order, not to give us information 
beyond what is available in sense experience. This brings us 
to the Kantian notion of the "thing-in-itself" Was Ding an Bich] 
which is a key concept for him. He believes that there must be 
a basis for what exists which transcends the things, and he refers 
to the hypothetical ground of thskhings which moist as the "taros 
in-themselves" (the in-self referring to an abstractiofl or isoititiom 
from all sensible matter. The upshot of this is to claim that 
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there is a sharp division between what is truly knowable and what 
is mere construction of the intellect (note the similarity to 
Plato's doctrine of the Forms). It may be said that the entire 
enterprise of Hegel consists in an attempt to put the "thing-in-
itself" (which is the rough equivalent to an "essence")back into 
the world as Spirit (which is the essence of the world). 
b. Kantian morality and Christianity. The Kantian morality 
has the division between will and reason as its basic structure. 
As noted above, the will is subjected to the demands of moral 
reason as the decision-making process of the person attempts to 
determine what is the ethical course of action. Though in his 
earlier of the "early" writings Hegel follows the basic Kantian 
morality in forming his philosophy of religion, he later in the 
"early" period attempted to make "love" the unifying force in religion. 
c. Proofs of God's existence. Kant recognized three kinds 
of demonstrations of God's existence: the Ontological, the Cos-
mological, and the Physico-theological. We do not have the liberty 
to follow more than the conclusions here. The Ontological arg-
ument, as Kant understands it, starts from the a priori concept of 
God alone. The basis of Kant's rejection of this proof lies in 
two areas: first, the concept og an absolutely existing being is 
unverifiable, and second, we cannot overcome the gulf between the 
(mental) concept and the really existing thing. The Cosmological 
argument (from the fact that things exist) and the Physico-theological 
(from the experience that there is purpose and order in the world) 
break up on several accounts. Most telling is the fact that 
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we cannot use the information based on sense data to argue what 
is beyond observation, since we are using what is already giVen 
as categories in our own minds to prove what is in principle 
unprovable. In other words, these proofs are - _,. based on a 
sense of orderly existence which is not "in things" but in our 
minds. Again, ideas of reason cannot constitute; they can 
only regulate. 
There is a sizeable literature on this material. For a 
general account of Kant, the standard textbooks are fine 
(Collins, History, is particularly lucid). Of especial 
interest on the problem of knowledge in Kant and Hegel 
is Navickas, pp. 6ff. The discussion by Harris in Faith 
and Knowledge , pp. 17-25 is extremely important in coming 
to grips with the problem of Hegel's appropriation of Kant's 
terminology. For a detailed analysis of the proofs ofGod's 
existence, see Collins, God in Modern Philosophy. Maluschke's 
chapters 4 and 5 are particularly edifying on a more 
technical level. 
D. Post-Kantian Idealism 
The four thinkers which we will consider in this section 
are all considered "Idealists." By Idealism we mean an opposition 
to both Naturalism and Realism. Idealism is a trend in the his-
tory of thought (not confined to any one period of history) which 
claims that mind and thought are more real than material objects. 
As opposed,to Naturalism, Idealism denies that thought is a process 
derived from nature and makes the counter-claim that our very 
concept of "nature" is a mental construct. As opposed'to Realism, 
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Idealism denies that material things exist independently of the 
mind. Idealism claims that "things" as we know them are (in 
the radical, or "subjective" form) not "out there" at all, or 
(in the more typical form) are unknowable without the structuring 
function of the mind. Kantian Idealism is called "Critical 
Idealism" because it is of the latter type (in conjunction with 
the "critical" philosophy of Hume). The successors to Kant were 
quick to spot several fault-lines in his philosophy, and it is 
this modified Idealism as expounded by those post-Kantians which 
we will address here. 
1. Jacobi: the philosophy of religious feeling. Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) was no systematic philosopher, but 
an insightful critic of other philosophers. Himself a mystic, 
he was deeply influenced by Pietism and was a bitte4anemy of 
the antisupernaturalistic religion of the Enlightenment. He was 
deeply influenced by Spinoza and Hume. From Spinoza he came 
to realize the consequences of rationalistic religion, and felt 
deeply repulsed by Sp hozism (which he considered the equivalent 
of fatalistic pantheism). He was positively influenced by Hume, 
who claimed that the role of religion in life is confined to 
the feeling of the reality of the human consciousness. 
In opposition to Kant, Jacobi made a radical shift in his 
interpretation of the role of faith and reason. Kant clearly 
designated the knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding 
as the most "real" while relegating Reason to a secondary role. 
To state this in ordinary language, Kant placed besaation and 
its systematization into the role of rationality, and placed 
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"reason" in the role of faith. Jacobi opposed this with &Amore 
"common sense" approach, claiming that the immediate intuition 
of what we call real (sensation and thoughts of the existing 
world) is "faith" because we accept the world around us with 
the same immediacy as faith. What Kant calls Reason Jacobi claims 
to also be a form of belief, since condepts such as God, 
immortality, etc., are not accessable to the understanding except 
by faith (in its more usual sense). 
The upshot of this is that feeling[Gefehi (usu,lly having 
a rather broader meaning than the English "feeling")) is now the 
basis of all knowledge. Hegel shows a guarded sympathy for this 
view in the early work Glauben and Wissen [Faith and Knowledge, 
1802), which stated that all ordinary knowledge is a kind of faith. 
Nonetheless, we will see that Hegel castigates this position for 
having reduced all knowledge to feeling. As he often said With 
reference to Schleiermacher, our knowledge of the absolute truth 
is not a matter of edification but a matter of systematic 
philososphical knowledge. 
We note in passing that this is the source of Schleiermacher's 
theology. Granted that Schleiermacher was influenced by other 
sources (e.g. Plato, Spinoza), still, Jacobi was the primary 
source for ScWeiermacher and, in the twentieth century (with Fries) 
also Rudolf Otto. 
On the source and content of Jacobi's philosophy, some 
excellent sources are Beck, and Ironer 1,303-315. On the 
relation of Jacobi to Hegel, see the concise discussion 
by Harris in Difference pp. 25-32 and the magi terial 
treatment of Bonsiepen, pp.42-3, 55-63. 
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2. Fichte: the philosophy of Subjectivity. Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte (1762-1814) tried to systematize philosophy around what 
he understood to be the main point of Kantianiem, that the self 
is primary and is the means of relating to the world. HiS phil- 
osophy of subjectivity (so called because he starts with the 
thinking subject) begins with the Ego (self). and from the 
existence of the Ego deduces a system of scientific knowledge 
[Wissenschaftslehre] (again, scientific meaning absolutely true). 
He employs a triadic dialectic in the form thesis-antithesis- 
synthesis (this is frequently mistaken for Hegel's dialectic as 
well)which follows this pattern: thesis: The Ego posits itself 
(I am myself; I=I); antithesis: the Ego op-poses itself (non-I 
is not myself; something exists which is not-I); synthesis: 
(finite)Ego and (finite)non-Ego are both contained in the infinite 
Ego. The second stage, the antithesis, corresponds to the 
"world"; here we can see the influence of .Spinoza and we will 
see something similar in Hegel. 
This rather mysterious teaching is aimed at maintaining 
the subjective consciousness as the starting point of our knowledge, 
and from its existence positing the existence of the world. The 
unity of self and world is found in the Absolute mind or subject. 
It is not easy to see how he overcomes the problems Kant had 
with the self-world relation; it seems that his problems are just 
as severe , if not worse. 
For descriptions. of his philosophy, see, for example, Collins 
(History) and Copleston. For a good account of his writings 
relate to Hegel's early philosophy, see Differenoepp. 32-39. 
Again, Bonsiepen provides an insightful discussion on pp. 
64-67. Kroner, 1,362-534, provides an extensive description 
, of his philosophy and explicates the relation to Kant. 
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3. Schelling: the philosophy of Identity. Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph von Schellidg (1775-1854) traversed no lessYbhan four 
distinct (though cumulative) stages in his philosophy. Though 
the other stages are also of considerable interest to scholars, 
our main interest lieswith the third, his "Philosophy of 
Identity." First propounded at length in 1803, this is basically 
a reworked Spinozism. In contrast to Spinoza's dead, materialistic 
determinism, Schelling proposed that neither a philosophy of 
nature nor a philoeophy-of knowledge (mind) are adequate alone; 
they need each other for completeness. He claimed that nature 
and knowledge are bonded by reason in an undifferentiated identity. 
Itself springing from the Absolute, Reason is the source of both 
(external)nature; and (internal) knowledge. The supreme law 
of reason is the law of identity, AAA. Thus, while some dist-
inctions are to be made regarding:form (e.g. subject-object), 
the essence of all is an undifferentiated unity. (It was this 
claim which led Hegel to remark tartly in the "Preface" to the 
Phenomenology that this is "the night in which, as it is said, 
all cows are black" [Phen 9/Phan 17)). 
This leads to a vitalistic pantheism (influenced by Giordano 
Bruno and others), where life is the principle of the inorganic 
world. He held that we can distinguish God formally foom nature, 
but not essentially. God cannot be understood rationally, because 
God's essence is will which is evident only in his action. 
Schelling's philosophy is similar to Fichte's in that he 
is still operating with an Idealism which seeks to unite thought 
and reality. But there is a major difference, in that Schelling 
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placed the primary seat of reality outside the mind. For this 
reason, Schelling is traditionally designated an "Objective 
Idealist" and Fichte a "Sub4ective Idealist;? 
The best general souwces are the same as for Fichte. Cerf's 
innovative dialogue between Kant, Hegel, and Schelling in 
Difference, pp. xxiv-xxxv,is very informative. See Rosen, 
pp. 58-62 for a concise as helpful discussion. A magisterial 
treatment is in Kroner(I,535-612 and II, 1-254). 
E. Romanticism 
There can be no doubt that Hegel's philosophical doctrines 
were shaped by the romantic philosophies of this contemporaries, 
but it is not so clear how-far their influence extends into his 
philosophy. The very diversity of their ideals and the lack 
of systematization which was characteristic of that movement 
is also a serious reason why we shall have difficulty showing 
their precise influence on Hegel. It is clear that he became 
less "Romantic" as he matured, but there remained unmistakable 
elements in his philosophy to his death. Our consideration of 
their influence on Hegel's philosophy will fall under three 
headings: the Greek Ideal, the revolt against mechanistic physics, 
and the ideal of the hen kai pan. 
A concise survey of the course of thought in the fifty 
years prior to and including Hegel's youth, summarizing 
the thought and relationships of Romantics to other move- 
ments, is in the first chapter of Taylor. (This is a 
"must" for everyone- one reviewer enthusiastically remarked 
that Hegel would have learned from itl) Chapter XVI of 
Randall is very helpful in understanding the Romantic spirit. 
Arthur 0. Lovejoy's classic includds a fine chapter (Ten) 
on the principle of plenitpde in Romanticism. 
1. The Hellenic Ideal. We are justified in referring to the 
Hellenic Ideal for two reasons. (We are limiting the scope of 
"Romanticism" and "Romantics" to the Germans roughly contemporaneous 
-22- 
with Hegel.) This was an "ideal" in the sense that it was an 
artificial reading of Greek culture. The Greek Ideal was deriveid 
from exalted philosophical and literary works, not from study 
of archaeology and works displaying the life of the.common man 
(e.g., Hesiod). This was also an ideal in that the Romantics 
believed that this "age of Pericles" is an ideal which transcends 
time and is applicable for today. 
There were two basic characterisations of the Greek man 
which were common among the Romantics. Ole was that of the "New,  
classical" harmonious man who lives within the limits set by the 
gods. His life is dominated by sophrosy5, sober and harmonious 
living. The other ideal was that of the "universal traveller," 
the free spirit whose mind ("genius") roams the range of reality 
in order to experience life to the fullest. The second (which 
is even more unreal than the first) overtook the first during 
the period of Sturm and Drang in the 1770's and dominated the 
Romanticism which most 'influenced Ihigel. 
In his earlier years (but not abandoned later) Hegel was 
fond of comparing the Greek Volkareligion [people's religion] 
with_ Christianity. He admired the Greek syncretistic attitude, 
which incorporated the customs and religions of its constituent 
peoples into its culture, and deprecated Christianity for arrogantly 
banning native religions. (Note his well-known complaint; 
"Christianity has depopulated Valhalla and destroyed the sacred 
groves.") Though Hegel was always in favor of this syncretistic 
view of religion, his gveater interest was that people be allowed 
to remain in their indigenous religions (this is important, he 
held, since he believed that native government and native religion 
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belong together). Unlike many of his contamporaties, Hegel did 
not find viable prospects for rebirth of Greek culture; he held 
that it is impossible to retUrn to a revitalized Hellenic culture. 
What we need to do, he claimed, is to learn to appropriate their 
values and strengths as part of the present. 
The final point of Hegel's Involvement With Greek culture 
lies with the concept of the polls. He believed that the reason 
why Prussia had had such a iiserable history up to his time was 
that there was too much individualism (fostered, he held, by 
Rationalism, Pietism, and the Enlightenment). He held up the 
Athens of Pericles as his model for a city in which the will of 
the individual and the collective will of th city are the same. 
In such an idyllic social climate, there will be cooperation 
and unity which will certainly advance the progress of Spirit 
in the World. 
The classic work on this topic is Gray's. Gray works expertly 
in the area and actually provides a rather good introduction 
to Hegel's philosophy. Also very helpful are the first 
chapter of Taylor and Plant (entire book; especially chapters 
I, II, and VII) and Rosen, passim. The monograph:OfXkites does a 
good job on Hegel's early conception of religion. 
2. The attack on mechanistic physics. As we noted in the discussion 
of Kant, his theory of knowledge is primarily devoted to an account 
oChOW the newborn science of physics can be preserved from 
destruction by the monster of skepticism. The appearance of 
Newton's 1Principla in 1687 marked the terminus a quo for an 
age of mechanistic science, particularly physics. The Newtonian 
physics is characterized by the working of laws which are innately 
contained in the universe, requiring no external (divine) acts 
of preservation to preserve them. The result of the new mech-
anistic physics was widespread, influencing anthropology and 
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social theory to a radical extent. 
The Romantics were unified in their disdain for mechanism. 
They wanted desperately to grasp the unity of the universe as 
an organic, living being (this is also an early Greek notion). 
They demanded a re4urn to their Greek ideals, man living in 
nature as part of nature, united with it as part of a cosmic 
life-force. 
Randall chapter XI is a good account of the new kechanism. 
Again, the first chapter of Taylor is good. 
3. the hen kai En. This expression from Leasing expresses the 
desire of the Romantics to unite reality. Though Leasing was 
certainly more in the Enlightenment tradition, his Spinozistic 
desire to unify all into a unity of substance (pantheism) does 
sound a bugle call to'the Romantics. 
For the purposes of this study, we may simplify the aims 
of the Romantics into four main desires (profiting from the 
analysis of Taylor, chapter one). The first desire of the 
Romantics was to unify anthropology, which the Enlightenment had 
dissected. The second desire was to propose a novel view of 
freedom. ' The Enlightenment saw freedom as the absence of 
oppression from the state and church, but the Romantics viewed 
freedom in terms of the free expressiveness of the individual 
person. The third was a call for unity with nature, to find the 
community of the human spirit with the spirit of life in nature. 
This found several expressions, all amounting to an exaltation 
of "feeling" [Gefdhl]; typical is Schiller's famous Lied an 
die Freude [Ode to Joy). Used by Beethoven in his Ninth (Choral) 
Symphony, Schiller in this poen) refers to "joy" as the "magic 
which binds back together what custom boldly divides" and in 
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numerous ways expresses the hen kai pan theme. The fourth goal 
was to find community with other people on the basis of community 
with nature, in a polls-like unity. 
Hence our characterization of this goal as the hen kai pan, 
the one and the all. Remembering our initial analysis of the 
Enlightenment, that they struggled with- the problems of individ-
uality and science, we see that the Romantics struggled with 
same problems but reached quite different answers from the Enlight-
enment. Hegel does fall heir to some Enlightenment (principally 
as he used and altered the philosophical tendencies of Kant and 
his successors), but on the whole he is far more sympathetic with 
Romantic ideals. We will not be far off base, for example, if 
we characterize his famous Phenomenology of Spirit as the 
struggle for the individual consciousness (the one) to find its 
place in what lies outside it (the all). 
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Notes to Chapter One 
1I cannot agree with Findlay's opinion that Hegel's philosophy 
was "autochthonous growth, begotten more out of his own personal 
broodings over the mysteries of Christianity and on the strange 
arguments of the Platonic Parmenides, than from the philosophers 
who went before him in time"(article "Hegel" in O'Connor, Critical 
History, page 322). Actually,Hegel was perhaps the most history-
conscious of all philosophers. Findlay's remark (indeed this article) 
is sadly below the level of his usual fine scholarship; his writing 
and the nature of his'historical studies show us that he does not 
really believe this. 
2For Hegel's own discussions of these thinkers, consult the three 
volume Vorlesungen Ober die Geschichte der Philosophie [Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy]. 
3 This is a good approach to understanding Hegel's philosophical 
enterprise in general. It is used by Rosen (5ff.), Gadamer (7f, 
33, 58), and Kroner II, 255, with considerable success. 
4Jones, p.21. 
5Kainz, Commentary, page7. 
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Chapter Two: Hegel°s Philosophical Enterprise 
We are now ready to investigate the Hegelian system itself. 
We begin this chapter with a biographical sketch, including notes 
on his writings, and devote the remainder of the chapter to a 
discussion of the nature of his writings. 
A. Hegel's life and writings .  
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was born in Stutt- 
gart. He was sent to the local school at the age of three 
and the Latin school at age five; at the age of ten he went to the 
excellent local Gymnasium. In the winter of 1788-89 he began 
study at the Tdbingen stift (theological "foundation"; roughly 
equivalent to a seminary). Sharing a room with Wilderlin and 
Schelling, he declared his chief areas of study to be philosophy 
and theology. Though his lifestyle was rather "free" (he enjoyed 
drinking wine and playing cards at the local cafes somewhat to 
excess), he was a gifted student who stayed at or near the top of 
his class. Upon the passing of his examination in theology in 1793, 
(Switzerland) 
he went to Berne4as a private tutor in accord with the custom of 
his day. As was also the custom, he used his private time to read 
and develop his.own thoughts. In 1797 he took a more appealing 
position in Frankfurt (where his friends were). This was a period 
of intense questioning for Hegel, and he wfote numerous essays 
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in his private journal which were published by Hermann Nohl in 
1907 under the title Hegels theologische Juggndsichriftes. Though 
several essays are fragmentary and all are from a young and tender 
mind, they are quite helpful in better understanding the later Hegel. 
Some of these essays will be examined in Chapter Five. 
In 1801 he accepted a position at the University of Jena as 
an unsalaried lecturer (as a privatdotent he would be paid by the 
individual students on a per-lecture basis). There he collaborated 
with Schelling for ak_couple of years on the Kritisches Journal. 
He published his first book of any sort in 1801(the so-called 
(Phanomenologie des Geistes) 
Differenzschrift), but his first major workAdid npt appear until 
1807. This work was written hurriedly in 1806 while Napoleon 
was besieging the city; Hegel escaped the looting troops .with the 
last part of the manuscript in his pocket. 
Desperately needing a job, he accepted the editorship of 
a newspaper (Die Bamberger Zeitung). There at Bamberg he was 
able to keep up with the details of world events, in keeping with 
his desire to be.yell-informed regarding the progress of Spirit 
in the world. Finally bored with his position to the point of 
desperation, he pleaded with his friend Niethammer to find him a 
different job. Being the senior inspector of the public sciools, 
Niethammer had him placed in Nurenberg as head-master of the 
Gymnasium (1808). Though the multitude of duties was #ppressitioe, 
Hegel did find time to get married in 1811 (he was 41; his bride 
Marie was 20) and begin publication of his next work. This was 
the ponderous Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic)(Book One, 
1812, Book Two, 1813, Book Three, 1816; Book One substatially 
revised, 1831). He was blessed with a fine and happy family life 
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to the end of his days, having two sons who distinguished themselves 
professionally. They also had a daughter who died in infancy and 
there was the illegitimate son Ludwig, born in 1807 in Jena 
to the wife of Hegel's landlord. 
In 1816 Hegel finally received an invitation to teach at the 
University of Heidelberg. While there he published his EnzyklopUdie 
der philosophischen Wissenschaftan in Grundrisse [Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences in Outline] in 1817, and his reputation 
grew steadily. In 1818 he was asked to teach at the University 
of Berlin, to replace the famous Fichte who had been gone for 
several years. (His famous conflict with Schleiermacher, then 
Rector (President) of the University, began immediately but did 
not escalate to seriousness until 1820.) While at Berlin he became 
the most important philosopher in Europe and was considered such 
until a few years after his death. In 1821 he finished his 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [Basis of the Philosophy of 
Law], a description of the proper functioCing and theoretical 
foundations of the. State. 
While at Berlin he was asked to fill numerous official posts 
and found himself quite busy with activities other than teaching, 
including election to the post of Rector in 1829. 
He died in 1831 after a very brief illness, traditionally classed 
as cholera, but this is by no means certain. 
Hegel published only four major works during his lifetime: 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic, Encyclopedia, Philos-
ophy of Right. But there are literally bushels of notes from his 
lectures which have been published. The two editions published 
by his !friends and students (1832 and 1841) also cantkin lecture 
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series on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion, 
the history of philosophy, and aesthetics. There remain bushels 
more of letters, notes, notebooks, and such which are invaluable 
to serious researchers. Much already is published piecemeal, but 
are now being published in a continuous text-critical edition 
by Felix Meiner Verlag in a planned set of 36 volumes. 
Most introductions of any size offer a worthwhile introduction 
to Hegel's life and works. Franz Wiedmann's little Hegel is 
a delightful introduction to his life, times, and works which 
has no equal. He provides a sane and basically neutral 
account of the events which are considered controversial. 
Unfdrtunately, the fine bibliography and multitgde of fascin-
ating pictures which grace the German edition has been 
decimated in the English edition. 
The more detailed biographies in English are those by 
Mueller and Kaufmann. Both are essentially accurate regarding 
facts, but need to be used critically. Kaufmann's work, 
like his book on Nietzsche, is more noteworthy for its polemic 
and literary discussion than for any phil aophical erudition. 
Kaufmann spends too much energy proving theses already known 
and accepted (e.g., the conclusion of Haering that Schiller 
was an important influence on the young Hegel) and not enough 
energy elucidating Hegel's philosophy. He sees Hegel as 
decidedly anti-Christian, which is simply not true to the 
extent which Kaufmann claims (Kaufmann was more anti-Christian 
thah Hegel). Kaufmann's dislike for Hegel is quite apparent , 
and on the whole his book is not all that useful for someone 
trying to get his bearings in Hegel. Overall, this book is 
edifying after some other reading has been done, but is not 
a good place to start. 
Mueller is sympathetic with Hegel, but the English version 
of his work is but a pale shadow of the German original. 
Though enlightening, it is helpful more as an intermediate 
discussion than as a beginning resource. Reviews of these 
books are to be found in Weiss' "Critical Survey° article 
in O'Malley, The Legacy of Hegel. On the whole, these 
works should be used after a basic acquaintance with the 
Hegelian system has been achieved from more even-tempered 
and reliable sources such as those by Wiedmann, Taylor, Rosen, 
and Collins. 
Of the technical biographies we mention the main ones: 
Rosenkranz, Haym, Fischer, Haering, and Glockner. Karl 
Rosenkranz was a disciple of Hegel and is considered a very 
reliable source for information about Hegel's life and thought 
because he was not strongly associated with either the "left" 
or the "right" wing Hegelians. (Right wing Hegelians were 
theologically and politically conservative; Most left wing 
Hegelians were atheists an/or Marxists.) His Georg Wilhelm 
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Friedrich Hegels Leben (1844) is still a staple for research. 
Rudolf Haym's Hegel and sein Zeit (1857) is important, but 
Haym did maliciously alter and delete some facts and materials. 
The Hegels Leben, Werke, end Lehre of Kuno Fischer gives the 
perspective of a Right Hegelian. The painstaking researches 
of Theodor Haering (1929-38) and Hermann Glockner (1929-40) 
are scientific and immensely thorough and helpful. 
B. Synoptic overview of Hegel-'s metaphysics 
Difficult though it is to briefly summarize Hegel's thought, 
the practical worth of this survey will depend on the reader's 
initial grasp of Hegel's system. In order to do this efficently, 
we will limit our consideration to the skeleton of his system, 
his logic/metaphysics (which are the same thing for him). Such 
a summary is best made by taking two complementary points of view 
first, the trans-human (if we use the term divine this will only 
be confusing later)and then, the human perspective. 
Seen from a trans-human perspective, that of what he would 
call logic (or, he would also say, theo-logic), we can trace the 
same movement in two ways. Logically, cosmic or "universal" histopy 
consists in a movement from the most general (and empty, as we 
noted from Spinoza) to the most particular, and then to a unity 
of the two. Since the universal concept is indeterminate it is 
without content, it is incomplete and strives for completion. 
This completion can come only in "knowing" the content which it 
lacks. This striving is not because of any conscious desire (the 
universal concept has no consciousness of its own), but because 
it is logically necessary that everything incomplete find completion. 
(These rather confusing axioms will be described and explained in 
Chapter Fear.) The upshot of this is that the Universal strives 
to know itself through Particulars which are implicit in it. 
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Since both are one-sided, the universal without content and the 
particular without form (since it is a multitude of singulars 
unrelated to a universal), the unity of the universal and particular 
seeks to find itself. From a logical point of view, this conjunction 
of the universal (the major premiss) and the particular (the minor 
premiss) seeks a conclusion. All this will be clearer after 
discussing the other elements which form part of his system. 
The other part of this trans-human viewpoint is what Hegel 
refers to as the divine. Hegel's use of this approach is easier 
to grasp because his language and concepts are simpler and more 
familiar, but yet it is much more difficult because what he means 
by. God and divine are not at all what is usually meant. Nonetheless, 
this approach from the side of theological language is helpful to 
us. Hegel uses the language of the Christian Trinity, stating 
that the Universal which existed 'before" the world is the Father, 
the Father alienated part of himself from himself, which is 'the 
world (the kingdom of the Son, who emptied himself), and the path 
of return is that of the Spirit, who unites Father and Son. 
In the third age, that of Spirit (Geist; note that the German 
for Holy Spirit is Ileilige Geist), the universal and the particular 
are united in the community. It may be helpful to note a similar 
train of thought on the part of the Modal Monarchians, who claimed 
that the Godhead exists in three discrete modes such that when the 
Father existed, the Son and Spirit did not, and when the Son existed, 
the Father and the Spirit did not, etc. So far as I can tell, this 
parallel with Hegel's thought is unintentional, and it is not an 
exact parallel, but still it is close enough for helpful compar-
ison. 
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In brief, the trans-human (divine) viewpoint sees the progress 
of a contentless universal concept from being "in-itself" to a 
state of self-alienation, where it is broken into itself and its 
other. Having come to know itself in its other (not unlike knowing 
oneself in a mirror image), there is then the return back to. itself 
as Spirit living in human consciousnesses and unifying itself. 
In Hegel's scheme of things, these three steps (alienation, self-
knowledge, unification) correspond to his interpretation of the 
Christian story of creation, redemption, and sanctification. 
From the human point of view, the Hegelian philosophy is the 
striving of Spirit to return tQ its original oneness. Since the 
original (and the later forms of) Concept is not conscious, it 
gains consciousness only in the self-consciousnessAonly in the 
human consciousness. Perhaps the axiom which is most helpful 
overall in understanding the Hegelian philsophy is his claim, 
"Das Wahre 1st das Ganze"([The True is the Whole] Phen 11/Phan 19). 
This has several implications. First, the partial is false. 
Second, since rationality is a uniquely human feature, our search 
for truth implies that we will be thinking the whole. Ultimately, 
the whole is to be found only in the final reunion of Universality 
and Particularity (God and the World, in his peculiar language) 
as a completed Whole, where the Universal knows itself as Particular 
content and is thus a balanced whole. 
I believe that there are three most basic principles which 
underlje the Hegelian system, and that these principles must be 
clearly understood before the system can be understood at all. 
The first, and.the most basics is his desire for balanced 
completeness. Reminiscent of Plato's compasive desire for unity, 
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Hegel insists that his philosophy begin with and return to a 
balanced completion. 
The second principle, inherited from Spinoza, is that neg-
ativity is the foundation upon which all reality is built. The 
contradictory, negative nature of everything having real existence 
dictates that nothing can be static. There is a ceaseless passing 
into opposites, moving back and forth from one (conceptual)pos-
ition to an opposite which was implicit in the first. 
But what keeps this shifting mass of contradiction from 
sheer chaos? What makes it intelligible? The answer to both 
ggestions is the third principle, immanent teleology. Inherited 
from Aristotle, Hegel's teleology dictates that from beginning to 
end (this is already telic language) there is a rationally 
intelligible purpose which is being acted out in existence. This 
teleology is immanent in the structure of what is, it is a logical 
and rational movement. Does this allow us to predict future events? 
Hegel would say, yes and no. We do know that the end of reality 
is one of balanced wholeness which is rationally intelligible, and 
in this sense we know the future. But since the true is the whole, 
we are not licensed to predict individual events; they are only 
part of the picture and do not accurately reflect any balanced 
state of affairs. We cannot expect that any individuals will 
necessarily obey the rational teleology, but we know that the 
overall progress will be positive (Hegel calls this the "Cunning 
of Reason" [Die List der vernunft]. 
Really worthwhile summaries of Hegel's philosophy are sur-
prisingly rare. The treatments of Gray (the Introduction 
to the excellent G.W.F. Hegel On Art,Religion, Philsophy) 
and Findlay (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, sub "Hegel") are 
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concise and helpful. Ideally, one should read as many 
summaries and introductions as possible and check them against 
the texts and against each other. This is more necessary 
in the case of Hegel research than in most other beginning 
philosophy studies, because there is simply no brief and 
satisfactorily lucid introduction to his philosophy (with 
the possible exception of Collins, History). 
The treatments of Findlay (Reexamination), Rosen, 
Taylor, and Collins (History) are the plumb-lines by which 
the others can be measured. For first-hand acquaintance, 
the beginning reader will best get. hold of all three parts of 
the Encyclopedia and page through it. The presentation which 
was given in the text above is uniquely my own, and I believe 
that it singles out some key points frequently passed over 
in the majority of summaries. 
C. The character of Hegel's philosophizing 
1. His style. Hegel's written style is notoriously difficult. 
Bloch puts it well:"Hegel is difficult, there is no doubt; he is 
one of the most inconvenient [unbeguemsten] among the greatest 
thinkers. Many of his sentences are like vessels filled with 
the strongest and most fiery drink, but the vessels have only very 
small handles or none at all. Also, there are copious transgressions 
against civil grammar which strike not merely against the linguistic 
purist, hnd sometimes right on the head" (Subjekt-Objekt, p.18). 
We know that Hegel (like Kant, whose formal style is not much 
better) was able to write clearly when he wanted to do so. Some 
commentators are bitterly critical of Hegel's style (e.g. Mueller, 
who calls the Phenomenology a "pitiful heap of unintelligible 
gibberish" (p.2071), while others are more sympathetic. Bloch 
defends Hegel bravely, holding that Hegel was trying to say in 
ordinary language what is impossible to adequately express in any 
language. He claims (and rightly so) that Hegel is in fact using 
many languages at once (pp. 19-20),but perhaps Bloch defends the 
vagaries of Hegel's style too much. A certain amount of the 
murkiness is certainly caused by the extreme haste with which the 
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Phenomenology and the Science of Logic were produced.1 
 We cannot 
discuss other views, such as that of Kaufmann, within this study. 
Suffice it to say that Hegelas style is extremely difficult, but 
this is mostly by choice as he strives to express a new system in 
old words (and barbarous combinations thereof). 
The discussions of Bloch (pp. 18-21), Kaufmann (pp. 115-138), 
and Mueller (p. 207 and passim) are interesting but all infer-
ior to the excellent treatment by Cook, Chapter IX. 
2. Hegel's attitude towards prior thinkers. In keeping with his 
dictum that the true is the whole, Hegel believed that philosophy 
does not sort and discard ideas. All prior thoughts are legitimately 
part of the Whole which alone is true. Those thoughts which are 
ordinarily (or technically) considered "false are actually legit-
imate parts of the Whole, no less than "true" ones, because they 
all contribute to the fullness of reality. Much like Aristotle, 
Hegel believed that the work of his predecessors is incomplete 
but important prolegomena to his own philosophizing. He says this 
clearly in the opening paragraphs of the Phenomenology of Sp&rit: 
The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis 
of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given 
philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted, 
and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does 
not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the 
progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple 
disagreements.2  
I am partial to viewing Hegel's way of doing philosophy 
as similar to the way an experienced editor operates with a 
staff of bungling cub reporters. That is, Hegel found it 
necessary to use the material which was given him, but with 
the constant need for revision and rearrangement. Thus his 
philosophical system is his own, but i. is composed principally 
of materials gathered by his predecessors and contemporaries. 
Cf. Gray, Hegel's Hellenic Ideal, pp. 68ff. 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
1Regarding the Science of Logic, Hegel wrote the following to 
his friend Niethammer:"It is no small task to write a 500 page 
book in the first semester of one's marriage.--But injuria temporuml 
I am no academic; reaching proper form would have taken me another 
year, and I need money now to live on" (Briefe I, p.393, translation 
mine ). 
2Phenomenology p.2; Phanomeno1ogie p.10:"SO fest der Meynung der 
Gegensatz des Wahren und Falschen wird, so pflegt sid auch ent-
weder Seystimmung oder Widerspruch gegen ein vorhandenes 
sophisches System zu erwarten, und in einer ErklArung fiber ein 
solches nur entweder das eine oder das andre zu sehen. Sie 
begreifftLdie Verschiedenheit philosophischer Systeme nicht so 
sehr als die f4schreitende Entwiklung der Wahrheit, als sie 
in der Verschiedenheit nur den Widerspruch sieht." 
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Chapter Three: The Absolute as Spirit 
"The Absolute is spirit; this is the supreme definition of 
the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its significance 
and content was, one may say, the ultimate purpose of all education 
and all philosophy." Here we have a central concept in Hegel's 
philosophy, that the ultimate basis of reality is Spirit. 
This chapter is to be an explanation of the implications of 
this claim. 
A. Hegel's predecessors on the Absolute 
We are, of necessity, limiting this discussion of the Absolute 
to Hegel's immediate predecessors: Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and 
Schelling. These four are divisible, for our purposes, into two 
pairs: Spinoza and Schelling; Kant and Fichte. 
1. Spinoza and Schelling: The Absolute as Substance. We recall 
from Chapter One that Spinoza claimed that God is the same as Nature, 
and that this is again equivalent to infinite substance. What most 
people found shocking, and what Hegel found untenable in this 
position, is the fact that substance is ordinarily associated 
with dead, inert matter. Though this is not quite what Spinoza 
intended, certainly his detemministic world held no attraction 
for Hegel. We recall that Schelling posited (in his third period 
of thought) a common source for nature and knowledge, namely reason. 
In his earlier (second) period he had espoused (and never repudiated) 
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the further claim that nature is superior to mind, and wart the 
mind knows it receives from nature. This is claiming that the 
basis for reality is actually nature(which is itself from reason), 
and that the knowledge which we have of nature is a result of 
reason. Thus both Spinoza and Schelling held that nature (as 
substance) is the prime source of reality. Hegel repudiates this 
approach, holding that the Absolute is not only substance, or 
principle, but is also subject. 
2. Kant and Fichte: The Absolute as Subject. Kant and his 
disciple Fichte both claimed that the knowing subject is most 
basic in reality. Kant modestly left the subject primarily in 
the human consciousness, subjugating all knowledge to its formative 
influence. Fichte went further, making the Ego the cosmic ground 
of existence. Hegel was not content with this approach, either, 
since claiming that the Absolute is subject leaves many unanswered 
questions regarding the relation of the (mental)subdect to 
(physical)reality. 
The most helpful discussions of this are in Collins, History, 
and Rotenstreich, Chapters one and two. 
S. Hegel: the Absolute as Spirit 
1• The ambiguity of Geist. A long-standing disagreement among 
Hegel scholars concerns the "proper" translation of the word Geist. 
Sometimes it signifies the individual human mind (in which Geist 
comes to consciousness), and sometimes it signifies universal 
Spirit in the world. At times he intends both meanings, but usually 
he is emphasizing one or the other. While Mind is important in 
Hegel's philosophy, it conjures up too many reminders of the Neo- 
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Hegelians in early twentieth-century Britain. Spirit, on the other 
hand, is easily applied to the "human spirit," the "spirit of 
an age," and the Holy Spirit-- all very important aspects of Geist 
for Hegel. 11  
There is some important literature on this matter. An import-
ant discussion of this and °thee difficult terms is recorded 
in Kainz' article "Roundtable" (in O'Malley, Legacy). 
Robert Solomon's important article, reprinted in Macintyre, 
is helpful on a deeper level. We see another instance of 
Kaufmann's careless impatience as he hastily dismisses the 
"Mind" translati,n without considering its merits (p.160). 
2. The reflective unity of Substance and Subject. The Absolute 
is Spirit. Spirit, for Hegel, includes both substance and subject; 
these tug aspects are indicated by the alternative translations 
Spirit and Mind (respectively). The absolute substance, the 
ground of all, is also spirit. How can these two, subbstance 
(which undergoes the dialectical changes of generation and cor- 
ruption) and subject (characterized by intuitive immediacy) be 
unified? Hegel believes that the act of reflection captures 
both of these aspects. Reflection of the intellect thrives on 
the dialectic of opposites, such s is present in generation and 
corruption, and reflection may also refer to the return of the 
substance to itself. Thus Mind (human and "cosmic") reflects 
on itself, knowing itself intuitively and also dialectically.2  
This is not the easiest to understand, but it is very important. 
Hegel's vision is certainly profound, uniting subjective thought 
with objective substance under the aegis of reason. The ration- 
ally reflective subject is automatically reflecting on something. 
It is Vital that this point be understood, for, like Plato, 
Hegel is adamant in insisting that ultimate reality is rationally 
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knowable. Though the term "reason" can be confusing as Hegel 
uses it, Hegel insists that "the true is the rational."3  
Most helpful on this matter are Collins, History, and 
Rotenstreich. 
3• The Absolute as Systematic Science. Absolute Mind/Spirit 
finds its perfect embodiment in Science. Again, "Science" is 
not the modern empirical science but the ancient conception of 
scientia, absolutely true knowledge. The redundant modifiers 
"systematic" and " philosophical" are sometimes added to emphasize 
the fact that this is ultimate wisdom. 
"that the True is actual only as System, or that the Sub-
stance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the mental image 
of the Absolute as spirit--the most exalted Concept and that which 
belongs to the modern age and its religion."4 Substance and 
Subject age fully united into a balanced whole only in the 
systematically whole philosophy. The form of philosophy, the 
logical categories of a thinking subject, becomes identical with 
the substance of reality, which is the content of philosophy. 
The term "actual" is the operative element in the passage above, 
and this term will be explained in Chapter Four below. Here we 
will note the conclusion that the True is completed, or properly 
balanced, only in a System which encompasses all reality. 
One implication, noted above, of this notion of the "systematic 
whole" is that the form and the content of philosophy become ident-
ical. The very expression "Absolute" implies that this is the 
all-inclusive category, and the most basic and pervasive of all 
categories. Hut the Absolute (Mind/Spirit) not only has form 
and content, it is an identity of form and content. Put in other 
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words, logic and metaphysics are the same. Metaphysics, the science 
of substance, and logic, the 'science of the thinking subject, 
are reflectively iddntical in Absolute Mind/Spirit. "[The devel-
opmental stages of Spirit] no longer fall apart into the opposition 
of Being and Knowing, but abide in the simple unity of Knowing. 
They are the True in the form of the True, and their difference 
is merely the difference of co tent. Their movement, which organ-
izes itself in this element into the Whole, is the Lbgic or the 
Speculative Philosophy."5  
The best source for this information is the Preface ',to the 
Phenomenology. On an advanced level, the expositions by 
Glockner (p.135ff.) and Hinrichs (Chapter VIII,"Das absolute 
Wissen") are superb. 
C. The road to Spirit 
1. The problem of an introduction. The expositor of Hegel faces 
the same problem as Hegel himself faced: where do we start? Since 
truth resides only in the finished whole, there is no "true pro- 
position" with which we can make a beginning. Either we cannot 
start at all, which is absurd, or we can start anywhere. The latter 
is the case, and it is the person learning who decides where to 
shows 
start: "In this way philosophyA itself to be a circle which goes 
back into itself, which has no beginning as in the sense which 
other Sciences have, so that the beginning has a connection only 
to the subject who resolves to philosophize, not to the Science 
as Science." The start with the "person" is precisely that of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
An extremely helpful discussion of the problem of a beginning 
is to be found in Hyppolyte, pp. 4-11. Hegel presents a 
more technical treatment of this problem in the Science of 
Logic, pp.67-78/ Wissenechaft der Logik I, pp. 51-64. 
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2. Universal education: Remembering in Experience. What is the 
process whereby one learns the ultimate scicnce? This is a 
major problem which faced Hegel. His anewer is not one Which is 
particularly simple, but it is profound and very important to his 
philosophical system. 
As we will see more fully in the discussion of dialectic 
(Chapter Four below),' Hegel claimed that the course of cosmic 
history has passed from the (empty, cententless) universal into 
its opposite, (mere confused) particularity, and the unity of 
the two one-sided parts into the synthesis of each into the 
(balanced, "actual") individual. Individuality, for Hegel, is 
always the unity of universal (objective) and particular (sub-
jective) into a balanced whole. The (metaphorical) explanation 
which Hegel gives is that the empty universal must discover the 
particular content which is implicitly its own. The logical ex-
planation is that every concept implies a contradictory concept 
which must be explicated before the first is fully understood. 
In order to know its implicit content, the universal becomes the 
implicit particulars and observes itself in the human mind (subject) 
which lives in the human body and the physical world (substance). 
As the human consciousness understands the world, this is also 
the Spirit educating itself. The result of this observation of 
the world is the reflective reunification of the Substance and the 
Subject in Speculative Science. 
From this general account, we are ready to flesh out some 
details. There are two concepts which are central to properly 
understanding his accounts anamnesis ["remembering," Erinnerung] 
and Experience [srfahrung]. 
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As we noted from the historical survey of Plato's influence 
on Hegel, Plato's doctrine of anamnesis (that the eternal soul in 
each successive human life retains the memory of what was learned 
in the previous lives) finds a new life in Hegel. "Although9 from 
one point of view, the first appearance of the new world is only 
at first the Whole veiled in its Unity, or is its universal found-
ation, yet the richness of previous existence is present to 
consciousness in memory [Brinnerung]. The notion that individuals 
are contributing to the overall "education" of Spirit (since the 
wisdom of Spirit cumulates with the passage of historic 1 events) 
is a concept sometimes given the precise formulation "transcendental 
propaedeutic." 
We have discussed the "remembering" and its cumulative action, 
now we can see how this amounts to "education." Hegel writes: 
"The series oitghapes„ which the consciousness passes through 
along this path, is rather the comprehensive history of the 
education [Bildung; also "culture") of consciousness itself to 
[the goal of] Science,"8 We cannot stop to discuss the similarities 
of this approach to the then contemporary literary ge*re of 
Bildungsroman (or Ersiehungsroman) [culture/education-novel] as 
exePlified by Goethe's Meister wilheims Lehrjahre. 9 What matters 
here is that Spirit is educating itself in the observation of 
the world. 
Hegel's very word for "experience" is instructive. The 
German word Brfahrung contains the concept of "journey," while 
the synonymn Brlebnis emphasizes the inner subjective quality of 
"experience.° Thus, we would refer to events in life as part of 
Erfahrung and an emotional experience as BrIebnis. We can note 
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with interest that Hegel's emphasis is betrayed by the fact that 
Gauvin's Wortindex gives about 150 instances of forms of Erfahrung, 
in the Phenomenology, while only two instances of erleben occur 
in the entire work. 
From our explanation of how Aristotle influenced Hegel's 
philosophy, we concluded that the Aristotelian notion of Science 
as composed of chains of syllogisms is the root of Hegel's concept 
of experience. Again, Aristotle starts with a definition which is 
general and to which is added a particular observation which forms 
the "middle term" upon which the conclusion is based. The ideal 
instance of this is the "Barbara" mood, which follows the form 
"All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal." 
For Hegel, the logical (universal, objective) seeks particular 
observations which can serve as the mediating "middle term" to 
balance itself. When the universal finds the (subjective) 
particulars it logically requires, the resulting balanced conclusion 
is only the basis for further discovery. Thus the concept of 
experience, for Hegel, follows the linking together of knowledge 
discussed by Aristotle. "This dialectical movement, which conscious-
ness exercises on itself, regarding both its knowledge and its 
object (insofar as the new true object springs out of it), is 
properly [uniquely]that what is named experience."10 
In brief, we can describe the universal education of Spirit 
as the process by which Absolute Mind/Spirit finds its balancing 
truth in the [philosophical] observation of itself as substance 
in particulars. This filling of the universal with observed 
particulars is precisely the return of Spirit to itself. 
pp. 613ff. 
Collins (History) and Findlay (Re-Examinatiodo pp. 85ff., will 
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help the reader get his bearings. But the classic on this 
topic is Heidegger's famous essay, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung." 
Also helifful are Blbch, pp. 473ff., on anamnesis, and Puntel, 
pp. 287ff., "Die Erfahrung als dialektische Bewegung." 
-47- 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1My translation; Enzyklopadie sect. 384:"Das Absolute ist der 
Geist; dies ist die h8chste Definition des Absoluten.--Diese 
Definition zu finden und ihren Sinn und Inhalt zu begreifen, 
kann mann sagen, war die absolute Tendenz aller Bildung und 
Philosophie..." 
2This point is made in Phenomenology, p.21 (Philnomenologie pp. 
29-30):"Now, though this negative appears at first as a disparity 
between the "I" and its object, it is lust as much the disparity 
of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside 
itself, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own 
doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When 
it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence ident-
ical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, 
and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of 
knowing andltruth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; 
it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the 
property of the "I", it is the self-like or the Concept." (Trans-
lation modified.) 
3The problem, as we will see in Chapter Four, is in the definition 
of "rational." Kroner, from a perfectly valid perspective, is 
also justified in his judgment,"Hegel ist ohne Zweife1,41er grOsste 
Irrationalist, den die Geschichte der Philosophie kennt"[Hegel is, 
without doubt, the greatest irrationalist which the history of 
philosophy knows.] (11,271). Kroner's entire discussion (11,267-
272) is very helpful. 
4My translation; Phenomenology p.14. Phanomenologie p.22:"Dass 
das Wahre nur als System wirklich, oder dass die Substanz wesentlich 
Subject ist, ist in der Vorstellung ausgedkt, welche das Absolute 
als Geist ausspricht,--der erhabenste Begriff, und der der neuern 
Zeit und ihrer Religion angeh8rt." 
The reader probably wonders by now why I take so many examples 
from the beginning of the Phenomenology. I do so because the Vorrede 
[Preface] and the Einleitung [Introduction] to the Phenomenology 
are dofisidered to be classic introductions to his philosophy. 
Hopefully, repeated use of examples from these sections will 
encourage readers to feel some impetus to read and study these 
sections for themselves. 
5 My translation; Phenomenology p.22. PhAnomenologie p.30:"Sie 
fallen nicht mehr in den Gegensatz des Seyns und Wissens ausein-
ander, sondern bleiben in der Einfachheit des Wissens, sind das 
Wahre in der Form des Wahren, und ihre Verschiedenheit ist nur 
Versbhiedenheit ist nur VershCedenheit des Inhalts. Ihre Bewegung, 
die sich in diesem Elemente zum Ganzen orgafiisirt, ist die 
Logik oder speculative Philosophie." Similar statements abound 
in Hegel's writings. (The German texts sometimes space for emphasis 
and sometimes use italics. We will adopt the policy in cppying 
the quotations to use italics whenever emphasis is indizcated.) 
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Chapter Three Notes, Continued 
6My translation; EnzyklopAdie sect. 17:"Auf diese Weise zeigt 
sich die Philosophie als ein in sich zurOckgehender Kreis, der 
keinen Anfang nur eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt, als welched 
sich entschliessen will zu philosophieren, nicht auf die Wissen-
schaft als solche hat." 
7My translation; Phenomenology 7. PhAnomenologie p./5:"Indem 
einerseits die erste Erscheinung der neuen Welt nur erst das in 
eine Einfachheit verhullte Ganze oder sein Grund ist, so ist dem 
Bewusstsein dagegen der Reichthum des vorhergehenden Daseyns 
noch in der Erinnerung gegenwArtig." 
8My translation; Phenomenology p. 50. Phanomenologie p.56:"Die 
Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, selche das Bewusstseyn auf diesem 
Wege durchldufft, ist vielmehr die ausftrliche Geschichte der 
Bildung des Bewusstseyns selbst zur Wissenschaft." (See also 
Phenomenology, sections 28 and 70.) 
9See, for example, Kaufmann, page 158. 
1 
°My translation; Phenomenology.p.55. Phanomenologie p. 60:"Diese 
dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewusstseyn an ihm selbst, 
sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande austibt, in 
sofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand daraus entspringt, ist 
eigentlich dasjenige, was Erfahrung genannt wird." 
As further evidence of the many-sided character of the word 
Geist, witness the meanings given by Johannes Hoffmeister in 
his Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, Zweite Auflage 
(Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1955) sub"Geist": Luft, Hauch, Aether 
als unsichtbare Substanz [air, breeze, aether as invisible 
substance]; das Lebensprinzip selbst [the very principle of 
life]; angels, demons, etc.; weltgeist [the (impersonal) spirit 
of the world; der Heilige Geist [the Holy Spirit];der menschli6he 
Verstand [human intellect]; die menschlich schbpferische Intelligenz 
[human creative intelligence]; "the spirit of" a time, nation, 
person, etc. 
11 
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Chapter Four: The Hegelian Dialectic 
Hegel's dialectic is the best-known feature of his system, 
and rightly so. Dialectic is his method, the moving force which 
makes th4system go. The dialectic is a formidible (more like 
"impassable") barrier to understanding his kystem unless it is 
explained in detail. In the previous three chapters we have seen 
the elements which feed into the workings of his dialectic, and 
now we are ready to put the pieces together. 
Hegel discusses two dialectics, one "false" lbecause it is 
partial) and the other "true" (because it thinks the Whole). 
The first is that of Understanding [verstand] and the second that 
of (Speculative) Reason (vernunft]. 
A. The dialectic of Understanding 
"In mathematical cognition insight is an activity which 
is external to the main point (Sache has the connotation of 
essence for Hegel]; from this it follows that the true thing 
is altered by it. The means, construction and proof, indeed 
contain true propositions, but nonetheless it must be said 
that the content is false."1  
The reasoning power of the faculty of Understanding is limited 
to our ordinary logical methodology, and as such is "false." 
This dialectical movement is limited to consideration of opposites 
without the realization of how to unify them. As he admits above, 
the propositions themselves may be true, but when one is finished 
with theiproper procedures there remains only a mass of one-sided 
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claims. 
"This formalism...imagines that it has comprehended and 
expressed the nature and life of a form when it has endowed 
it with the same determination of the schema as a predicate. 
The predicate may be subjectivity or objectivity, or, say, 
magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, east 
or west, and the like. Such predicates can be multiplied to 
infinity, since in this way each determination or form can 
again be used as a form or moment in the other, and each can 
gratefully perform the same service for an other. In this 
sort of circle of reciprocity [ein cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit] 
one never learns what the thing itself (die Bache selbst] is, 
nor what the one or the other is."2  
The pedestrian multiplication of one-sided predicates is now 
Hegel characterizes all thought which has passed for logic and 
philosophylbefore his time.3  
The conceptions of philosophy as circular and infinite are 
very important to Hegel. He views the kind of philosophizing 
which has gone before him (all examples of the dialectic of 
Understanding) to be examples of bad circularity and bad infinity. 
For Hegel, "bad" circularity is the endless motion from point to 
point without going anywhere new. Likewise with "bad" infinity, 
which is ceaseless passing from opposite to opposite without 
reaching completion. For the Absolute to be infinite and circ-
ular in a "good" sense, there must be an upwards spiraling as 
well. 
"But sunk into the material and advancing in its movement, 
(scientific cognition) returns to itself, but not before its 
filling or content is taken back to itself, is Simplified to 
the point of determinateness, has reduced itself to one side 
of its existence, and has passed over into its higher truth 
[seine h8here Wahrheit]. On this basis emerges the simple, 
self-overseeing whole itself out of the wealth in which 
its reflection appeared to be lost." 
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The distinction between the dialectics of Verstand and 
Vernunft is so basic that discussions can be found in nearly 
any introduction. A basic presentation (though rather 
pedestrian and not altogether lucid) is given by Nancy Sherman 
in Kant-Studien 71,2(1980)238-253. Particularly helpful on 
a deeper level are Bloch (pp.121ff.) and Eric Weil .in O'Malley, 
Legacy. 
B. The dialectic of Reason 
The dialectic of Understanding is stuck on the level of 
simple oppositions, or as he also says, mere negations. Negativity 
is the basic feature of existing things, but it is not sufficent 
to remain on this level if progress is to be made. There must be 
a second negation, a negation of negation, which negates this 
dividedness. This second negation (see Phen. section 30/PhAn. 
p. 26) is the reversal of opposition which posits the reuniting 
of Spirit to itself. 
In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not unessential 
determinations, but determination insofar as it is essential; 
its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual, 
but the actual, that which posits itself and is living in 
itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which 
begets and passes through its own moments, and this entire 
movement constitutes the positive[in it] and its truth.5  
The recurrence of the word "actual" alerts us'to the primacy of 
actuality and balance in his dialectic. The desire for unity and 
completeness (good Platonic goals) characterizes Hegel's speculative 
dialectic. 
1. The ambiguity of aufheben. It may be said that the 
entire Hegelian system is based on a delightful ambiguity in 
the verb aufheben. Hegel himself describes the double entendrd' of 
this word (usually translated "to sublate") in an excursus in 
the Science of Logic: 
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''To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the 
one hand, it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it 
also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to 
preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something 
is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which 
is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus 
what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only 
lost its immediacy but is not on that account annhilated. 
Thus, the first negation is suppressed in the positing of the 
second negation, but not done away with. The first negation is 
actually made part of the second negation. This is often expressed 
in the literature as the "sublation" of the first negation and 
its "supererogation" into the second negation. 
2. The Concept. The German word behind the words Notion and 
Concept (Begriff) is a rich one which is not easily captured in 
translation. Much as Geist entails both an objective comprehensive- 
ness and a subjective apprehension, so also Begriff has both 
sides in its purview. Some philosophers (mostly British) mil- 
itantly advocate the translation "Notion," arguing that this 
carries the implication of nous (intuition) which is an important 
part of this term. These are usually the same ones who call 
for the "Mind" translation of Geist. The advocates of NOtion 
justly claim that this mental emphasis is important, but as with 
Geist, the other side is more helpful in their rendition. 
The word "notion" is far too light in its connotations to 
properly denote such a pregnant term as Begtiff, and there is 
also an etymological aspect to the problem. The verb greifen 
means to grasp or clutch, and this is the root meaning of Begriff, 
"that which is grasped"(by the mind). This parallels the Latin 
conceptus, "captured together with." It is doubtful whether 
anyone save a die-hard philologist actively associates every use 
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of Notion with nous and Concept with conceptus. When these arg-
uments are all weighed, it seems that Concept best expresses the 
meaning of Begriff. 
See the "Roundtable" article by Kainz in O'Malley, Legacy. 
It is not an easy matter to properly understand the relation 
of the Concept to the Hegelian system in general, but it is 
absolutely essential that the reader understand this point. This 
is th+erve center of 'his system. We will discuss the following 
three aspects of the Concept: the meaning of Concept, synonymns 
for the Concept, and teleology in the Concept. 
a. The meaning of Concept. The principal significance 
of the Concept is the balanced underlying unity which it denotes 
of existing things. 
Thus the dialectical movement of substance through causality 
and reciprocity is the immediate genesis of the concept, 
the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the 
significance of its becoming, as of every becoming, is that 
it is the reflection of the transient into its ground and 
that the at first apparent other into which the former has 
passed constitutes its truth. Accordingly the Concept is 
the truth of substance; and since substance has necessity 
for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself 
as the truth of necessity and as the mode of relationship . 
proper to the Concept. 7  
The Concept is the essence of all existing things. He claims that 
there is, underlying all things, a common bond of unity which 
flows through reality,and this unity is the Concept. 
It is only fair to point out, however, that there are, in 
addition to the Concept, many "concepts." As the Concept is the 
essence of all reality, taken as a whole, the lesser concepts are 
in turn the essences of aspects of reality. Thus there is a 
concept of law, a concept of mathematics, a concept of zoology, 
etc. All the (lesser)concepts are then interrelated in that they 
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are all aspects of the Concept. All concepts, in as much as they 
are still of particular parts of reality, are only partial and are 
therefore "false." The true existence of each concept lies only 
in its relation to the whole of reality, which is complete only 
in the Concept. 
b. Synonymns for the Concept. We can gain numerous 
insights into the nature of the Concept by studying expressions 
which contain correlative ideas. We will examine these three: 
"the truth ()Maas Wahrheit der], "essence"(weseml, and "actuality" 
(Wirklichkeitj. 
The expression "the truth of" has already occurred in 
several quotations given above in this study. The expression has 
two emphases which are worth our attention, one conceptual and 
one methodological. 
Conceptually, the notion of "truth" has reference to finding 
the underlying essence of reality (much as Aristotle's nous is 
discovering essences). In the Science of Logic he states: 
The demons rated absoluteness of the Concept relatively to 
the materia f experience and, more exactly, to the categories 
and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this 
material as it appears apart from and prior to the Concept 
had no truth; this it has §olely in its ideality or its 
identity with the Concept.°  
The true is only in the Concept, which is the underlying basis 
of all that exists. 
From the standpoint of method, we are solemnly warned that 
we must think the whole as found in the Concept. Since the true 
is the whole, and the false is the partial, it follows that 
whenever we are operating on a partial or one-sided level we 
have not yet found the true. 
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In the Phenomenology Hegel consistently uses the expression 
"the truth of" in his dialectical motion to express the overcoming 
of one-sided incompleteness. The expression "the truth of" serves 
to alert u to the fact that we have discovered the universal 
element which relates it to the whole. We frequently find that 
Hegel concludes sections of the Phenomenology with this expression, 
signalling that we are now ready to proceed to the next stage. 
The best way to appreciate this is to simply pick up.a 
copy of the Phenomenology and look at the last-paragraph 
of each of the earlier sections. An excellent discussion 
-ofEthis is in Phen.- pp. 66-47/Phtln. 70-71. See also Science 
of Dogic pp. 588, 577-578/Wissenschaft der Logik II, 
226, 214. 
The word "essence" is richly suggestive in this connection, 
for it brings to mind the numerous parallels which were probably 
also in Hegel's mind. We will mention only the most obvious 
one here, the connection with Aristotle's notion of essence. 
One of Aristotle's most frequent ways of referring to the 
essence of something is with the expression T6 're Av ervaL ("the 
something it was and continues to be" I. The fjv, being the 
imperfect tense of "to be," expresses the underlying unity and 
continuity of the thing being investigated. Aristotle's theory 
of knowledge hinges on the underlying continuity of the.subject 
[6nometuevov], since the thing remains itself despite accidental 
(superficial) changes. Hegel says the same thing: 
This knowledge [absolute scientific knowing] is a mediated 
knowing for it is not found immediately with and in essence, 
but starts from an other, from being, and has a preliminary 
path to tread, that of going beyond being, or. rather, of 
penetrating into it. Not until knowing inwardizes, recollects 
[erinnert] itself out of immediate [merely subjective[being, 
xltoes it through this mediation find essence. The German 
language has preserved essence in the past participle 
(gatietenj of the verb to bc; for essence is past--but 
timelessly past--being.9 
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From what has been discussed in the pages above, it should be 
clear that the Concept is the "essence" of reality, the one 
underlying truth which is , unchanging amidst all change. 
Actuality is closely tied to truth, for Hegel, for actuality 
clearly involves balance and wholeness. The German word which 
in Hegel means "actuality" Wirklichkeitj is ordinarily translated 
"reality"in other contexts, but not in Hegel. For Hegel, what is 
real [reels] is merely what exists, and is always particularized 
and one-sided. Actuality, on the otherhand, is a term which 
expresses what is ideal [ideel]. Actuality is the balanced and 
completed version of what here exists as partial; the actuality 
of something must be discovered by searching for the other side 
of its existing one-sidedness. 
All existing reality is determinate. Thus, the task of 
philosophy is t*ind the universal which complements this partic-
ularity. This aim was expressed in a quotation cited earlier in 
this chapter: 
In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not unessential 
determination, but determination insofar as it is essential; 
its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual, 
but the actual; that which posits itself and is living in 
itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which 
begets and passes through its Own movements, and this entire 
movement constitutes the positive [in it] and its truth.10  
c. Teleology in the Concept. As noted above in this paper, 
one of the key principles in the Hegelian system is that of an 
immanent teleology. Teleology is vital to the system, for without 
it there would not be an orderly system but something more like 
the blind, aimless, and malevolent "Will" of 6chopenhauer. 
There must be rationally intelligible purpose in Hegel's universe, 
and this is furnished by the very character of the system itself. 
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Because logic and metaphysics are only two different ways to express 
the same truth, Hegel maintains that the very structure of the 
universe is logical and rational. 
What has been said can also be expressed by saying that 
Reason is purposive activity [zweckmassige Thun]. The 
exaltation of a supposed Nature over a misconceived thinking, 
and especially the rejection of external teleology, has brought 
the form of purpose in general into discredit. Still, in the 
sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive 
activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the 
unmoved which is also self-moving, and as such is Subject.11  
3. The Conceptual dialectic of moments. The customary way 
of characterizing Hegel's dialectic is with the expression "thesis-
antithesis-synthesis," but this is, in fact, a poor caricature of 
his dialectic. A far more accurate (though less catchy) expression 
is "Conceptual dialectic of moments." There are three aspects of 
this expression which need our attention: moments (Nomente], 
mediation (vermittlung]/reconciliation (VersOhnungl, and the 
"cumulative effort." 
a. Hegel refers to "moments" as synonymous with "stages." 
A moment is a step in the progress of Spirit towards the goal of 
complete knowledge. As such, each moment is a necessary part 
of the whole motion but is °true" only as it is considered as 
part of the whole dialectic. Each moment is caught up [autlgehoben] 
in the cumulative sweep of the Spirit's education. 
There is a point of comparison with Aristotle's theory of 
time which may be interesting to note. Aristotle considered 
moments to be potential points in the continuum of time. For 
Aristotle, a "moment" is an "unreal" part of time, for true time 
is not composed of moments. Rather, time is potentially divisible 
into moments. While Hegel considers his "moments" to be real 
components of history, both Aristotle and Hegel agree that moments 
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considered apart from the flow of time are "unreal" or "untrue." 
For both, the truth of time lies in its actualized motion, not 
in the potential points along the way. 
b. The notion of mediation is central to Hegel's 
philosophy. So far as I can determine, his two usual words for 
mediation [Vermittlung] and reconciliation [Versiihnung) are 
essentially synonymous but perhaps express different emphases. 
The different emphases are revealed in the etymological roots. 
Nitte is the word for a logical middle term, and thus vermitt/ung 
has logical overtones which remind us of the logical/rational 
nature of mediation in his system. Der Sohn is the appellation 
for Christ in the German language, and his use of Versiihnung 
ought to call to mind the reconciliatory/redemptory work of 
Christ. On linguistic grounds we may say that VermittlunglOmphasizOS 
the logical necessity of mediation, while Versahnung emphasizes 
the resulting unity of opposites,but in point of fact these lex- 
ical distinctions may be finer than he intends. At any rate, 
the two are virtually synonymous. 
Hegel's unique concept of mediation/reconciliation centers 
in the notion of a "higher unity." The notion of "higher unity" 
is based on the notion of higher truth, which simply refers to 
"the truth of" a particular opposition. The higher truth of 
opposites lies in their being manifestations of the Concept, in 
which all opposites find their complement. Given the higher 
truth of two seemingly irreconcilible opposites, we can discover 
a unity which is "higher" than the opposites and unites them, 
What energizes this mediation is not a "third," but the very 
Concept which is the essence of the two opposites. Thus, mediation 
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is the self-movement of opposites to unity, or self-refleCtion. 
For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving selfi-sameness, 
or is reflection into self, the moment of the'I' which is for 
itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, 
simple becoming. The 'I', or becoming in general, this med- 
iation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy 
in the processnof becoming, and is the immediate self. 
Reason is, therefore, misunderstood when reflection is 
excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive 
moment of the Absolute. It is reflection that makes the True 
a result, but it is equally reflection that overcomes the 
antithesis between the process of its becomigg and the 
result...12  
.c. The cumulative effort. As discussed in Chapter three, 
the education of Spirit is cumulative. The goal of Spirit in 
the world.(as the Concept) is to probe all reality by discovering 
itself as the essence of all that exists. Thus Spirit is accum-
ulating full and perfect knowledge of itself. This is the telos 
of the. Hegelian philosophy. 
Excursus: The Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Myth 
In the interest of clarifying Hegel's dialectic, it is 
worth a few words to discuss the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis 
myth (we will refer to it as TAS). Since Hegel is one of those 
philosophers who are frequently alluded to but seldom read care-
fully, it is not surprising that he is glibly characterized as 
holding the TAS dialectic. This was actually foisted on Hegel 
by his erstwhile follower Karl Marx, based on the fact that Hegel 
borrowed aspects of his method from Fichte, who used this termin-
ology and method explicitly. 
The problem with the TAS scheme is that it misinterprets 
Hegel's philosophy at its most crucial point. The unique feature 
of Hegel's philosophy, what empowers it, is his claim that there 
-60- 
is an underlying reality in the world (viz., the Concept) which 
is not immediately evident 'apt nonetheless functioning. The 
Concept is what interconnects everything, and in the Concept 
all opposition is reconciled to itself in its opposite. 
The TAS scheme is the language of the Aristotelian syllogism, 
which operates by fixed rules. These rules carefully delineate 
the meaninglpf contradiction, identity, etc" and allow no exceptions. 
Hegel minces no words in telling us that this ordinary logic is 
stuck on the level of Understanding, and that this is insufficent 
for understanding the unifying operation of the Concept. If we 
persist is using the TAS language, we will consistently confuse 
ourselVes about the main point of the Hegelian system, Most 
descriptions of the Hegelian system do mention the proper role 
of the Concept in overcoming opposition, but use of the lang- 
uage of propositional thinking hinders our proper understanding 
of the conceptual dialectic of moments. Eric Weil has magnificently 
summarized the problem: 
a 
At the risk of shocking those who hold tolztradition boo much 
accredited, the Hegelian dialectic does net proceed by thesis, 
antithesis, and synthsis; it derives nothing from the Fichtean 
dialectic, to which it is violently opposed. It grasps the 
particular concept, purely and in its purity, sees it pass 
into its contrary, and testifies that this contrary is not 
3.0, but is the contrary of the first, which is thus preserved 
in it, mediated with itself.and,thus mediated, is itself 
preserved in being elevated and liberated from its particular 
finitude into a higher logico!ontological concept that is a 
result and at the same time the point of departure and uncovery 
of a new contradiction-harmony. The substance-accident pair 
moves into that of cause and effect, which passes into the 
category of interaction (wechselvirkung), a still-not-
established presence of the concept, the point of departure 
of a new chapter of the Logic . No particular concept is 
the concept; but the concept is only its own becoming within 
the movementof the particular concepts throughout the 
categories." 
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Other discussions are in Glockner, pp. 135ff., Mueller, 
p.4, Sarlemijn, p.122, and Kaufmann, pp. 167-69. Stace 
understands the basics of the dialectic, but discusses it 
in terms of propositions (TAS) instead of concepts; thus 
he castigates Hegel on p. 97 for having failed to succeed 
in carrying out his dialectic. Certainly Hegel did not 
intend a dialectic such as Stace attributes to him. 
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Notes to Chapter Four 
1Translation mine; Phenomenology p.25. Phanomenolog4.32:"IM 
mathematischen Erkennen ist die Einsicht ein fOr die Sache Ausser-
liches Thun; es folgt daraus, dass die wahre Sache dadurch ver-
Andert wird. Das Mittel, Construction und Beweis, enthAlt daher 
wohi wahre SAtze; aber ebensosehr muss gesagt werddn, dass der 
Inhalt falsch ist." 
2Phenomenology p.29; Phanomenologielp.36:"DieSer Formalismus... 
meynt die Natur und das Leben einer Gestalt begriffen und aus-
gesprochen zu haben, wenn er von ihr eine Bestimmung des Schema's 
als PrAdicat ausgesagt,--es sey die SubjectivitAt, oder auch der 
Magnetismus, die ElectricitAt,und so fort, die Contraction, oder 
Expansion, der Osten oder Westen und dergliechen, was sich ins 
unendliche vervielfAltigen lAsst, weil nach dieser Weise jede 
Bestimmung oder Gestalt bey der andern wieder als Form oder 
Moment des Schema's gebraucht werden, und jede dankbar der andern 
denselben Kienst leisten kann;--ein Cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit, 
wodurch man nicht erflhrt, was die Sache selbst, weder was die 
dine noch die andre ist." 
3An excellent discussion of this topic was penned by Hegel in 
his Introduction to the Science of Logic, "General Notion of Logic" 
(Wissenschaft der Logik I, "Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik"). 
4 My translation; Phenomenology pp.32-33. Phanomenolog116.39:"Aber 
in die Materie versenkt und in deren Bewegung fortgehe d, kommt 
es in sich selbst zurdck, abeilicht eher als darin dass die 
Erfdllung oder der Inhalt sich in sich zurticknimmt, zur Bestimmtheit 
vereinfacht, sich selbst zu Einer Seite eines Daseyns berabsetzt, 
und in seine hftere Wahrheit dbergeht. Dadurch emergirt das 
einfache sich dbersehende Ganze selbst aus dem Reichthume, worin 
seine Reflexion verloren schein." 
5My translation; Phenomenology p.27. Phanomenologie p. 34:"Die 
Philosophie dagegen betrachtet nicht unwesentliche Bestimmung, 
sondern sie in sofern sie wesentliche ist; nicht das Abstrakte oder 
Unwirkliche ist ihr Element und Inhalt, sondern das Wirkliche, 
sich selbst setzende und in sich lebende, das Daseyn in seinem 
Begriffe. Es ist der Process, der sich seine Momente erzeugt 
und druchlAufft, und diese ganze Bewegung macht das Positive 
und seine Wahrheit aus." 
6Science of Logic, p.107; Wissenschaft der Logik I, p.94: "Aufheban 
hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, dass es so viel als 
aufbewahren erhalten bedeutet und zugleich so viel als aufh8ren 
lassen, ein Ende machen. Das Aufbewahrenselbst schliesst schon 
das Negative in sich, dass etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und 
damit einem den ausserlichen Einwirkungen offnen Dasein entnommen 
sird, un es zu erhalten.--So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Auf-
bewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum 
nicht vernichtet ist." 
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Chapter Four notes, continued 
7 Science of Logic, pp. 577-8 (translation modified); Wissenschaft 
der Logik, II, p.214: "Did dialektische Bewegung der Substanz 
durch die KausalitAt und Wechselwirkung hindurch ist daher die 
unmittelbare Genesis des Begriffes, durch welche sein Werden 
dargesteilt wird. Aber sein Werden hat, wie das Werden dberall, 
die Bedeutung, dass es die Reflexion des Uebergehenden in seinen 
Grund ist, und dass das zunAchst anscheinend Andere, in welches 
das erstere dbergegangen, dessen Wahrheit ausmacht. So ist der 
Begriff die Wahrheit der Substanz, und indem die bestimmte 
VerhAltnissweise der Substanz die Notwendigkeit ist, zeigt sich 
die Freiheit als die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit und als die 
Verhilltnissweise des Begriffs." 
8 Science of Logic, p. 591 (translation modified); Wissenschaft 
der Logik II, p. 230: "Darin besteht die gegen und an dem 
empirischen Stoff und genauer an seinen Kategorien und ..Reflexions- 
bestimmungen erwiesene Absolutheit des Begriffes, dass derselbe 
nicht, wie er ausser und vor dem Begriffe erscheint, Wahrheit 
habe, sondern allein in seiner IdealitAt oder IdentitAt mit 
dem Begriffe." 
9Science of Logic, p.389; Wissenschaft der Logik II, p.3:"Diese 
Erkenntnis ist ein vermitteltes Wissen,denn sie Befindet sich 
nicht unmittelbar beim und im Wesen, sondern beginnt von einem 
Andern, dem Sein, und hat einen voklAufigen Weg,den Weg des 
Hinausgenens fiber das Sein oder vielmehr des Hineingehens in 
dasselbe zu machen. Erst indem das Wissen Bich aus dem unmit-
telbaren Sein erinnert , durch diese Vermittlung findet Bich 
es.deis Wesen.-Die Sprache hat im Zeitwort sein das Wesen in 
der vergangenen Zeit, "gewesen", behalten; denn das Wesen ist 
das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Sein." 
10My translation; for the German text from PhEnomenologie page 34 
see note 5 above. 
11 My translation; Phenomenology, p.12. PhMnomenologie, p.20:"Das 
Gesagte kann auch so ausged .dkt werden, dass die Vernunft das 
zweckmfissige Thun ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur 
fiber das miskannte Denken, und zunAchst die Verbannung der 
Aussern ZwekcmAssigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks dberhaupt in 
Misskredit gebraucht. Allein, wie auch Aristotles die Natur 
als das zweckmAssigi Thun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmit-
telbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend, oder Subject 
ist." 
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Chapter Four notes, continued 
12 Phenomenology, pp. 11-12; Phanomenologie, pp. 19-20:" Denn die 
Vermittlung ist nichts anders als die sich bewegende Sichselbst-
gleichheit, oder sie die Reflexion in sich selbst, das Moment 
des fersichseyenden Ich, oder das Werden Oberhaupt, dieses 
Vermitteln ist um seiner Einfachheit willen eben die werdende 
Unmittelbarkeit und das Unmittelbare selbst. --Es ist daher ein 
Verkennen der Vernunft, wenn die Reflexion aus dem Wahren 
ausgeschlossen und nicht als positives Moment des Absoluten 
erfasst wird. Sie ist es, die das Wahre zum Resultate macht, 
aber diesen Gegensatz gegen sein Werden ebenso aufhebt 000"  
13In 04Malley, Legacy, p. 56. 
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Chapter Five: Hegel's Philosophy of Religion 
It is said by some thatHegel's philosophy is thoroughly 
secularized (because God is finitized) and it is- said by others 
that Hegel's philosophy is supremely religious (because the goal 
of his philosophy is to reach divinity). Though both interpretations 
have considerable validity, neither is sufficently accurate to 
command our assent without further clarification. 
The curious fact facing the interpreter of Hegel's philos- 
ophy of religion is that he not only brings his •:own preconc.ved 
notions about religion and philosophy to the task, but that his 
very attitude already. is shaped by Hegel. The ideological 
backgtound of some interpreters (e.g. Marxists) has already 
inclined them to hold an atheistic reading of Hegel, the broad- 
minded theistic views of others has inclined them such that they 
find themselves attracted to the view that Hegel's philosophy is 
the epitome of Christian expression, and the traditional con- 
victions of others has already led them to perhaps accept the 
theistic reading of Hegel but completely reject the possibility 
of incotpqrating his philosophy of religion into their own. 
Among the secularists we note the names of Marx and Feuerbach 
(who denied that:Hegel4s claims are legitimate because they 
consider his claim to be literally that man "becomes God"),and also 
the more contemporary secularists Kaufmann, KoAve, and Findlay, 
who consider Hegel's discussion of "religious consciousness" to 
be a merely metaphorical reference to a completely secular 
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enrichment of the human consciousness. Among the supporters of 
Hegel's "theistic" philsosphy we include the so-called Hegelian 
Riight, and more recently, thelinterpretation of Iwan Iljin. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe some aspects of 
Hegel's phirpophy of religion. The magnitude of this topic, 
demonstrated by the vast literature, dictates that this chapter 
and the one which follows it must be selective. This discussion 
will :not pretend to be a full survey, as that can be found in 
the better books. Similarly, we cannot indulge in a discussion 
of later developments and interpretations of this philosophy. 
What we will do here is outline the progress of his thought to 
the mature position, and then show how certain 'biblical themes 
are given a speculative interpretation in his system. 
In the Conclusion we will complete our survey of his system 
by shifting perspectives, from the standpoint of religion to 
the standpoint of philosophy. There will see how religion 
fits into the entire scheme of speculative philosophy. In these 
chapters we will not give so much attention as before to the 
"literature reports" in past chapters, as the literature is 
vast and could not be effectively summarized in a few sentences. 
Rather, we will concentrate on introducing some key topics and 
allow the reader to use the books indicated in the Appendix 
devoted to an introductory bibliography to get started. 
A. Hegel encounters religion 
There is a wide variation of opinion regarding the value of 
Hegel's early manuscripts in establishing his philosophical 
doctrines. Some scholars view these notebooks as the musing 
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of a mere youth searching for self-identity. Others are more 
enthusiastic,claiming that these are among his best works 
and that all his later doctrines can be found lying dormant in these 
essays. The truth lies somewhere between these extreme opinions. 
We will discuss his early essays because they give us an under-
standing of the development of his later position, but it is 
essentially true that they are not vital to, our understanding of 
his mature position,' 
1. Volksreligion and Volksgeist. In a series of fragments 
dating from about 1792 (age 22), entitled by Nohl (pp.1-:72) 
Volksreligion und Christentum, Hegel discusses the relation of 
the "spirit" of a people [Volksgeist] and the religion of a 
people (Volksreligion]. Hegel claims thalthe spirit and the 
religion of a people go together, as the "spirit" is really the 
special product of the time and circumstances, while religion 
is both a shaper and the shaped as it interacts with the thought 
of the people. He extolls the Greeks for having a religion which 
achieved a good balance between the subjective will of the indiv-
idual and the objective will of the state. His prosaic account 
is interesting, but too early and fragmentary to be of great 
importance. 2 .  
2. Das Leben Jesu. Hegel's "Life of Jesus" was written in 
1795. This is a.confusing work, not only because it is difficult 
to interpret but also because the interpretations are difficult. 
Some consider it to be nearly meaningless (Knox refused to 
include it,. with the material mentioned immediately above, because 
"they have not seemed worth translation"), while others attach 
greater importance to it. This "life of Jesus" is not an ordinary 
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chronicle of the life of Christ, for it pays little attention to 
the historical events in his life (it stpps at the cross) and 
devotes most of its space to the preaching of Jesus. The words 
of Jegus are those of a Kantian moral preacher. It seems that this 
was important in Hegel's development, for there are themes which 
are not part of the Kantian philsophical enterprise (e.g., "harmony"). 
Hegel realized that the Kantian morality is not an adequate:basis 
for a religion, for there is a division between the will of the 
individual and the categorical (rigid universal) imperative which 
governs the acts of the individuil which (as noted in Chapter One) 
Kant's moral philosophy simply does not adequately unite. 
3. `Die Positivitat der christlichen Religion. With .the 
unsatisfactory outcome of the "Life of Jesus" Hegel proceeded 
to construct a better synthesis of the aims of Kant and the 
Greeks in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" (1795-6). 
He unites the Kantian and Gmedk philosophies, and compares this 
to the Christian religion. He decided that the Christian religion 
is woefully lacking because he believed that Christianity tends 
to institutionalize and petrify the "spirit" instead of allowing 
it to develop. Because Christianity is concerned with historicity 
and dogma, it is unable to freely develop with a culture and thus 
is inadequate as a "people's religion. 
In this text he sounds a complaint which is evident in all 
his later writings. The theme of "positivity' is important in 
Hegel's philosophy of religion. The main reason why Christianity 
failed was that it is too positivistic. (Positivism refers to 
limitation of inquiry to facts "posited" or given in any partic- 
ular case.) By discussing his thoughts so frankly in this essay 
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Hegel gives an important insight into his later writilv3s on 
religion. The reader will be rewarded generously if he carefully 
remembers to use this complaint against positivity as a basis 
for interpreting the Hegelian reinterpretation of Christianity, 
ancialso in reading the history of theology in subsequent decades.3  
4. Der Geist Christentum and sein Schicksal. Upon further 
writing and thinking, Hegel concluded that his analysis of 
Christianity did not properly comprehend its full potential. 
After the composition of the "Positivity" essay, he had a sort 
of religious experience which &ed him to appreciate the place of 
"love" in life. He still accepted the Kantian notion of duty and 
the Greek religious ideal of beauty, but in his 1798-99 essay 
"The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" he expressed the opinion 
that the Christian ideal of love is the :proper combination of 
Kantian morality (a kind of love, he thought) and Greek beauty. 
Thus, for Hegel in this essay Christian "love" is moral beauty. 
Now he places the onus on Judaism for not having an open religion 
of love, since it killed Jesus. 
5. Phenomenology and religion. The publication of his Phenomen- 
ology of Spirit in 1807 ended the early gropings for a clear 
understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. 
In this work he sets out an agenda which "puts religion in its 
place" in the strongest sense of the expression. As we will see, 
his very programme sets the result clearly in sight long before 
we come to the conclusion of the book. Before discusting the 
relation of religion to phenomenology, it may be helpful to expand 
on his definition of "phenomenology." For Hegel, phenomenology 
is simply the study (logos) of what appears in the world (phenomena). 
S. 
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It is the search for essences, the discovery of the Concept as 
we described it in the last chapter. 
Hegel's agenda in the Phenomenology determines the final 
position of religion in his system; as Dr. Collins puts it aptly, 
phenomenology tames religion. Our discussion of the problem of 
a beginning in Chapter Three revealed that for Hegel the progress 
fo the individual to Science begins wherever he may so desire. 
What matters is that this is the journey of Spirit (in the human 
spirit)back to itself as Absolute Spirit. It is, as we discussed 
above, Spirit observing itself in Nature and thereby explicating 
its own content. The religious experience is part of the self-
education of Spirit, and as such is part of the phenomenological 
path which Spirit must traverse. 
Hegel indicates frequently that the phenomenological path 
is one of intense struggle, a "labor of the Concept." As such, 
the experience of religion is part of the struggle of the human 
consciousness to reach absolutely complete knowledge. As we will 
see in more detail in the next chapter, religion is the stage 
penultimate to ultimate philosophical knowledge. This. unquest-
ionably subordinates religion to philosophy, since religion is 
only a moment on the way to the standpodnt of Science. 
Hegel indicates to us that the Phenomenology of Spirit 
system 
is an introduction to his entireA (see the subtitle of the 
Phenomenology). This is certainly so, and we can draw the 
obvious inference that this phenomenological approach to religion 
remains a part of his mature system throughout his career. 
Nonetheless, an examination of Chapters Seven and Eight in the 
Phenomenology reveals that his treatment of religion is less 
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subtle here than in later works. The Phenomenology of Spirit 
is the introduction to his mature philosophy of religion, but 
that philosophy of religion is much clerer in the Encyclopedia 
and the later collected lecture series. 
B. Themes 
The following themes are important in Bagel's philosophy 
simply because the recur quite often,and usually with some major 
philosophical import. It will be obvious from the start that 
he has no intention-,of-'explainine these conventional doctrines 
in any traditional way. From his criticism of positivity in 
Christianity and from his view of theology as servant to philosophy, 
it should be apparent that .he is reinterpreting these traditional 
doctrines so as to make them pedagogical tools for the furtherance 
of philosophical understanding. We ihould be fair and tote that 
he believed that these are more than literary parallels; he 
considered himself a pious Lutheran Christian and believed sincerely 
that these traditional doctrines are genuinely fulfilled in his 
philosophical system. 
1. Trinity Hegel believed that the notion of the Trinity is 
a good tool for explaining thl4ctivity of Spirit. He viewed 
the traditional view of the Trinitarian procession as parallel 
to his Universal-Particular-Individual explanation of cosmic 
history. He divided the history of the world into three ages, 
as we have already seen: the age of contentless unity (the Father) 
the age of estrangement, in which the Universal becomes Particulars 
(age of the Son), and the reconciliation of Universal and Particular 
in the (balanced) individual, or the presence of the Spirit in 
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the community of believers. 
In addition to numerous discussions of a Trinitarian nature 
in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Encyclopedia 
sections 566571 and Phenomenology section 77-0/ Philnomenologie 
pp. 410-411 are very explicit discussions. 
2. Death of God. As the Trinity is a general representation of 
the principle that all things must pass into their opposites to 
find a higher unity, the death of God is a general pict‘ire which 
illustrates numerous aspects of philosophical truth. As Collins 
points out (Emergence, 262ff.), there are three basic ways in which 
Hegel wants to discuss the death of God. First, he can report 
(as Nietzsche did later in the same century) that God is dead in 
the sense that belief and piety have declined disastrously. 
God is also "dead' in a second sense, that Christian religion 
can well be understood as a symbol of the hindrance which inst- 
itutionalization and dogma places on the progress of Spirit 
(again, the "positivity" critique). Third, and most important, 
is the speculative death of God. By this he .means the truth that 
all things must 'perish" before they can live. 
In this speculative mode of discussion, Hegel i referring 
to the death and resurrection of God as symbolic of the negativity 
and double negativity which is the heartbeat of speculative meta- 
physics. Further, Hegel wants us to understand that in.order to 
fit under the scheme of absolute philosophy the notion of a trans- 
cendant God must also perish. It ought to be clear by now that 
if the Absolute is what he calls God, and the Absolute becomes 
finite matter and mind in the world, th n God is finite and humans 
are becoming gods. There is a question whether it is more correct 
to speak of Hegel "secuiiarizing religion" or "sacralizing history," 
but the result is essentially the same. Human history is God's 
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history, and the human spirit (taken collectively) is becoming 
divine. 
There are numerous applications .of the "death of God" theme 
to philosophy. We will see that several of the upcoming themes 
are under the rubric of God's death. 
Collin's discussion in God; in Modern Philosophy (pp.202ff.) 
is also helpful. The 'historical report" aspect of the death 
of God can be found, for example, in the first lecture of the 
Vorlesungen Ober die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes. The second 
kind of 'death' is evident in the "Positivity" essay and runs 
through several works. On the speculative "death" see Phen.pp. 
454-5,470-71/ Phan. pp. 410, 414-5, and 418; in the 
Encyclopedia see sections 251 and 568ff; in FAith and Knowledge 
see p. 190 (Gesammelte Werke vol.4, 413-14). On the finitude 
of God, note the final words of the Phenomenology which 
include a quotation from Schiller which Hegel greatly altered 
by simply adding the word slur (only). The impact of this 
is to assert that God is limited to this world. The notion 
of a transcendent God is killed conclusively in his reworking 
of the proofs of God's existence. 
3. Incarnation. In keeping with his distrust of "positive" 
religion, Hegel is unwilling to speak very clearly regarding the 
historical life of Jesus Christ. He is more interested in discus-
sing the philosophical significance of saying that there was a 
being who was both true God and true man. 
There are three main points of significance for Hegel. First, 
the mention of xeveSaLc in Philippians chapter two is aptly 
symbolic of the creation of ther.world (for kenosis language see 
Phen. p.457 and 465/Phan.p.403 and410). The absolute, in creating 
the Son/world has emptied itself by alienating itself in particular-
ized negativity. Hegel is fond of the terms Entfremdung (estrange-
ment) and Rntgasserung (externalization). Christ is also to be 
considered the reconciliation [VersOhnung] and mediation(vermittiang] 
between God and man, precisely because as divine he is most fully 
human. Third, Christ is an important symbol because he reminds 
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us that death is a prerequisite to new life. The death of Christ 
was necessary, because he was fully divine in a certain sense 
but not in the fullest sense. The full divinity (presence of 
the Spirit) did not come about until after his death, at which 
time the (Holy)Spirit came to live in the more perfect immaterial 
form of Spirit in the life of the religious community. This is , 
 
symbolic of the relation of religion to philosophy, that religion 
is a physical-symbolic (and therefore incomplete) version. of 
philosophical truth, which is not withoul6symbolism but includes 
a higher level of representational thinking. 
4.Creation. It is not a simple matter to discuss the Trinity, 
death of God, incarnation, creation, and the related biblical 
topics in a series of discrete parts, for each of these is 
inseparably bonded to the others. All these themes are inter-
connected by the theme of negativity, and express aspects of this 
basic part of his system. 
According to the biblical record, the world was created 
ex nihilo by God. Since the Hegelian Trinity works out its 
progress in an act of self-alienation, Hegel's version of the 
creation account does not involve ex nihilo creation. Rather, 
instead of the Father creating the world and remaining transcendent 
above it (as the biblical record indicates), according to Hegel 
the Father is now alienated against himself in ole world. The 
world is two-faced: the Father (as logical Idea or Concept) 
and i "other" (dead particularized matter) taken together are 
the new—born world. Thus,creation by Hegel's account is simply 
the coming of age of the Son, or the stage in the Father's quest 
for self-knowledge which is self-alienation. Though ostensibly 
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a destructive stage, the seeds of reconciliation are built into 
the world (in the presence of the Father as Concept). Since 
the Father is also the logical Concept which is the essence of 
the world, redemption consists in finding the God/essence= which 
is in the world and becoming one with it. 
5. The Fall. If Hegel sees the purpose of human nature as that 
of partecipating in and becoming one with the divine element in 
the world, we would expect his account of the Fall into sin as 
failure to meet that ideal. But his point is more profound. 
Hegel understands the creation of Man to be simply the 
existence of man in the world, with no responsibility for the 
world. This amoral condition of innocence[schuidiosigkeitl 
is proper to a state of nature, not of spirit, because if 
Spirit is to be reunited to itself in the human consciousness 
there must be concern for nature. Thus it is necessary to "fall" 
from the state of innocence to a condition where the need for 
oftheheed 
reconciliation is recognized. From the awarenessA for reconciliation 
begins the long process of return to Absolute Spirit. 
6. Redemption. Contrary to the traditional understanding of the 
doctrines of creation, incarnation, and redemption, Hfgel is 
not particularly interested in the historical events with which 
these are traditionally associated. All three are understood to 
be processes whibh take place simultaneously on several levels 
of interaction. Creation is a negativity by which God Is contin-
ually dividing itself into the matter and form of the world, 
incarnation is the process whereby rational Spirit observing 
itself in nature leads itself to divinization, and redemption is 
a religious term for the philosophical process of reuniting 
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Spirit with itself. 
The terms 'redemption° and *mediation' both refer to the 
reconciling process, which .has been discussed at length above 
in various parts of this ppper. 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1Kroner has a good introduction to his early writings in the 
front of the translation by Knox. 
2Crites treats this well on pages 35-40. 
3Co11ins covers this thoroughly in Emergence, pp. 223-240. 
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Conclusion: Religion in the Speculative Philosophy 
In the previous chapter we got a good picture of how Hegel 
wants to understand the Christian religion. Again, the key 
insight is his disdain for "positive' religion and his systematic 
avoidance of it. His interpretation of the traditional doctrines 
reflects this, and so does his placement of religion in the 
speculative philosophy. He has made certain that religion is 
adequately "tamed" so as to not usurp the place of philosophy. 
In this chapter we conclude our outline of his philosophy 
of religion by showing how he can now channel the content of 
religion into his philosophy. Religion must be contained in 
the scope oliolhilosophy; Absolute Science not including any 
aspect of reality is nonsensical. 
Surely the reader has wondered by now what has happened to 
the non-Christian religions. The previous chapter was devoted 
to the Christian religion, because Hegel regarded Christianity 
as the epitome of religious thought. We cannot discuss his 
argumentation, but he did believe that his Lutheran religion 
is the highest stage of religious consciousness and most tompat-
able with the demands of philosophy. In his later years he 
still spoke of "we Lutherans" and claimed that philosophy had 
not weakened his faith but actually made it stronger. 
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A. The identical content of religion and philosophy 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel claims that religion 
and philosophy have an identical content (see Phen. p.485/PhAn. 
p. 427); there is ansidentifty between the God of Christianity 
(as he understands it) and the Absolute Concept/Idea. Hegel sees 
the object of both religion and philosophy as the Absolute, and 
the difference betweerthem lies in the way in which they come 
to know it. 
In his later works, Hegel explicates this difference clearly. 
Since the third part of this chapter is devoted to this topic, 
we will simply mention the main point here. Religion apprehends 
the Absolute with -both representational thinking [Vorstellenden 
Denken] and speculative reason, while' true philosophy is 
able to move past the need for pie'ture-thinking. Because 
religious thought is not yet fully conceptual, it is imperfect 
and is thus a stage on the way to philosophy. Still, the content 
of aesthetic, religious, and philosophical thought is identical. 
B. Proofs of God's Existende 
Hegel's reconstruction of the traditional proofs of the 
existence of God is extremely valuable in coming to grips with 
how he systematically relocates religion inside philosophy. We 
will cover his discussion under the following three headings: 
Hegel's "God," Hegel's critique of Kant, and Hegel's ontologichl 
proof. 
1. Hegel's "God". As we noted previously, Hegel's version of 
the Christian God is radically non-traditional. Hegel's God 
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is not a personal God (God attains consciousness only in the 
human consciousness), nor is it transcendent. The traditional 
concept of God is useful to Hegel in formulating his philosophy, 
but finally it must be recognized that this is nnly a reglesenta-
tional way of expressing philosophical truth. 
We may isolate three particular features of HegeL's God. 
First, God is not the God of theism (i.e., neither personal 
nor transcendent). Second, neither the form nor the content 
. of God is demonstrable by ordinary rational argument (i.e. the 
activity of mere Understanding). Third, God must:be dialectically 
subordinated to the Absolute. That is, it must be understood that 
the notion of God is an inferior way of referring to the Absolute, 
and that speculative philosophy is the highest mode of knowing 
the Absolute. From this description of God, we see how Hegel can 
now fit a "proof" for the existence 6f God into his philosophy. 
2. Hegel's Critique of Kant. In Chapter One we examined Kant's 
treatment of the proofs of God's existence. There it became clear 
that for Kant all proofs boil down to the ontological proof. Kant 
criticized the ontological proof for assuming that we can easily 
pass. from conceptual existence to real existence. The problem, 
he asserted, is that we are never able to leap from analysis of 
observable existing things to claims about non-observable things, 
for the limit of certain knowledge is reached when we attempt to 
discuss what is not observable. Discussion of God, the World, and 
the Soul is not possible on the level of scientific certainty. 
Hegel's attack on Kant centers on the notion of finitude. 
Kant has located the figilure of these proofs in the gulf between 
the (observable) finite and the (unobservable) infinite, while 
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Hegel is not satisfied with this divorce. In keeping with his 
dialectic, Hegel asserts that the finite is merely the phenomenon 
which covers the infinite essence of all really existing things. 
In the Hegelian system, it is axiomatic that individual things 
exist only because there is an underlying infinite essence, which 
is the Absolute. 
3. Hegel's ontological proof. Hegel distinguishes between the 
descriptive and the demonstrative functions of the three arguments. 
All three of the so-called proofs describe how we are led by 
observation of nature to affirm the existence of "God," but only 
the ontological proof is demonstrative. The two proofs Which 
are merely descriptive (the cosmological and the teleological) 
lead us to affirm the existence of the infinite, because the 
finite is only partially existing. It is more usual to dlaim 
that God must exist because only the infinite could be the completion 
of finite beings, but Hegel prefers to argue from the fact of partial 
existence (as he puts it, "nonbeing") to show that something must 
fully possess being. 
All three proofs reduce to the ontological, Hegel claims, 
because each contains in it an inner dialectic, and this dialectic 
leads to the ontological proof. Both the cosmological and the 
teleological proofs show that the existence of many partially 
existing beings is explained by the existence of the Absolute. 
This sounds pretty ordinary in the history of philosophy, except 
th at his definition of God puts this in an entirely new light. 
If God is immanent in nature and is only a moment in our philos- 
ophical cognition, then Hegel has not proved the existence of 
what is usually called God, but rather the existence of the absolute 
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essence in nature. What Hegel has done in his usual ingenious 
way is to use a conventional apparatus of thought and appropriate 
it for his own use in the System. Hegel has proved the existence 
of the essence of the world, and he has no qualms about calling 
this "God" the Absolute Idea or Absolute Spirit. 
C. Art, Religion, Philosophy 
Ih this section we are not so interested in each of the 
three areas of thought individually as in the relation which they 
have to each other in the Hegelian system. Thus, we will briefly 
survey the sweep of motion from the stage or moment of art to 
that of religion, and to philosophy. 
Art, religion, and philosophy are simply different ways of 
getting at the same truth, according to Hegel. Their content is 
identical, but their forms are different. The artist recognizes 
the Absolute with the senses, whether in drawing, music, sculpting 
or another medium. This is indeed the Absolute, but since the 
form of Absolute Spirit is logical, such a non-logical approach 
is not appropriate and adequate for fully knowing the Absolute. 
Religion is in a better position for knowing the Absolute. 
In religious thought there is both an element of "picture thinking" 
and rational (conceptual) thinking. On the one hand, there is a 
multitude of symbols which are operative in religion (the artistic 
aspect), but on the other hand, there is also the formulation of 
rational thought about God. This conceptualization is the "truth" 
of Eat in - religion, and thus religion is a synthesis of art and 
philosophy, but not fully either. 
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Philosophy includes the element of religion, but now 
thinks conceptually instead of pictorially. Since the progress 
of Spirit is the same as world history, the Hegelian philosophical 
understanding of the relation of religion and philosophy boils 
down to this: the religious community is where philosophical 
enterprise is functioning at its finest level. Rememering Hegel's 
distaste for static, fact-oriented religion, we see that Hegel 
envisions a harmonious community (viz., the state-church) wherein 
philosophical thought takes place with the support of a version 
of Christianity which is dynamically changing to match the devel-
opments of philosophy. 
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GETTING STARTED IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: 
A BASIC ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(Note: this list is restricted to English sources, beginning 
with the most• general and basic,.and ending with the 
more specialized) 
Wiedmann, Franz. Hegel: An Illustrated Biography. Trans. by 
J. Neugroschel. New York: Pegasus Books, 1968. 
A straight-forward brief biography, reasonably objective 
and quite accurate. The text can be rather dry, but the 
plates are excellent (they are far better in the German 
edition). A good chronology follows the text. 
Collins, James. A History of Modern European Philosophy. 
Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1954. 
A solid introduction to Hegel (and others of interest in 
the volume). Written from a rather traditional Roman 
Catholic perspective, but this does not influence the 
exposition. Highly lucid. 
Copleston, Frederick, S.J. History of Philosophy. Vol. VII. 
Paramus, NJ: Newman Press, 1963. 
An acceptable exposition in one of the stap1e histories. 
Though not exceptional, Fr. Copleston does cover the material 
in a brief and helpful fashion. 
Stace, W.T. The Philosophy of Hegel. New York: Dover Publications, 
1955 reprint of 1924 ed. 
A standard exposition, showing undue attention to the Logic 
and insufficent attention to the Phenomenology. It doesa, 
instigate and perpetuate some myths and inaccuracies, but 
generally helpful if not relied upon too heavily. 
Gray, J. Glenn. Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. New York: Columbia 
University Press (King's Crown division). 1941. 
Covering more area than the title indicates, Gray masterfully 
ties numerous aspects of Begel's thought together. Highly 
recommended. 
Kaufmann, Walter. Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary. 
Garden City, New York: Doublday & Co., 1965. 
As with G.E. Mueller's introduction, the main value of this 
book lies primarily in "debunking" Hegel, secondarily in 
presenting literary parallels and translations of some early 
manuscripts, and certainly NOT in "interpreting" or "commenting" 
on Hegel. His debunking of myths about Hegel (e.g., that 
he is the father of Naziism) is good, and the literary insights 
are interesting, but the reader will be unwise to trust any 
philosophical judgements on his word alone. 
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Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975. 
An excellent introduction on an intermediate level of dif-
ficulty. The opening chapter on the connections between 
the intellectual currents which preceded Hegel is magnificent. 
The remainder of the work requires some perseverence for the 
beginning reader to master, but will repay study generously. 
Findlay, John N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. Net, Yorks Oxford 
University Press, 1976 (slight revision of 1958 edition). 
A helpful discussion from an "Analytic" perspective. Its 
brevity is good in reducing the volume of material a person 
must read to get the "meat," but th re is sometimes a 
tendency tc be rather cryptic. On the .hole, none of 
Findlay's introductory discussions (including particularly 
that in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in O'Connor, 
Critical History have been especially helpful to me in 
putting Hegel's philosophy together. 
Rosen, Stanley. G.W.F Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of 
Wisdom. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974. 
An upper-level introduction which is rather demanding to 
use. The difficulty is not from opacity or imprecision, 
however, but due to the vigorous and searching character 
of his treatment. In my judgment, this is the best single 
volume in English on Hegel. A gold-mine of insights. 
Welch, Claude. Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century. 
Volume I: 17991870. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 
His discussion of Hegel's philosophy of religion is put in 
a valuable historical context and summarized ably. 
Crites, Stephen. In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. 
Kierkegaard on Faith and History. American Academy of 
Religion Studies in Religion, No. Chambersberg, Penn.?, 
American Academy of Religion, 1972. 
The discussion of Hegel is excellent, placing a helpful 
emphasis on his early philosophy of religion 
Collins, James. The Emergence of - Philosophy of Religion. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 
This is the magisterial exposition of Hegel's philosophy 
of religion in English. Though on a rather high plane 
of discussion, it will be intelligible and profitable 
to any reader. 
Collins, James. God in Modern Philosophy.Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Co., 1959. 
The section on Hegel's philosophy of God is excellent and 
will richly repay study. 
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Fabro, Cornelio. God in Exile: Modern Atheism. Trans. by Arthur 
Gibson. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968 
Fabro°s basic th sis in this magisterial study is that after 
Thomas Aquinas there is a marked decline in the quality of 
philosophy, and after Descartes° turn to the subjective 
the path to atheism is paved. Whether we want to buy his 
analysis, this work is a treasure chest of information. 
Yerkes, James. The Christology of Hegel. Missoula, Montana: 
Scholars Press, 1978. 
This dissertation is rather technical, but is a good study 
of the topic. Recommended highly. 
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PRIMARY SOURCE BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(Sources most central to grasping Hegel's philosophy) 
Samtliche Werke, JubilAumsausgabe in XX B&nden, Ed, Hermann 
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Three volumes. New York: Humanities Press, 1955. 
Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. Ed. Johannes Hoffmeister. 
Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1955. Highly instructive. 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction. 
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